

SECURITY
N.B. The g
UPGRADE

(N.B. The grading of this jacket must be the same as that of the highest graded document contained in it. The appropriate upgrading slip must be affixed when ever necessary.)

Contents checked
for transfer to
D.R.O.

P. P. O'Connell
(Sgd.)

Date 19.1.71

CONFIDENTIAL

H.M. DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

DEPT.
or POST

NE 3 EASTERN

FILE No. NE J 1/8 (Part)

TITLE: ARAB JOINT COMMITTEE ON JORDAN
INTERNAL SITUATION

S
358

REFER TO

REFER TO

REFER TO

NAME (and dept. when necessary)	TO SEE:	DATE	NAME (and dept. when necessary)	TO SEE:	DATE	NAME (and dept. when necessary)	TO SEE:	DATE
Regy A.C.S.M.		24/6	C.W.L.	(18)	nh	Regy		4/6
		24/6	Regy		24/7	C.W.L.	(32)(32)	4/6
		24/6	L.E.	(19)				
C.W.L.	(2)	26/6	Regy		21/7			
Regy		29/6	Acosh.	(19)	21/7			
C.W.L.	(3)		R		27/7			
1 Regy.		30/6	MR EVANS.	20.	13/8			
2	(3)(4)	30/6	Regy (a/c)					
Regy		2/7	ARE C.F.S.					
C.W.L.	(5)		CW	21	17/8			
Regy		8/7	Mr Evans	22				
C.W.L.	(8)(9)	8/7	Regy		24/9			
C.W.L.	(10)	15/7	P.H.	(23)	21/9			
Regy		13/7			25/9			
C.W.L.	11-14	13/7	P.H.	(24)(25)	R			
Regy		13/7	Regy		29/9			
C.W.L.	15-16		C.W.L.	(26)(27)	R			
Regy		14/7	R		12/10			
C.W.L.	(17)	14/7	C.W.L.	(31)				

7/1053

FOO

CLOSED
UNTIL
2001

Registry Address
Room No. 115
Downing Street (W)

SECL
N.B.
UPGI

(N.B. The grading of this jacket must be the same as that of the highest graded document contained in it. The appropriate upgrading slip must be affixed when ever necessary.)

CONFIDENTIAL

YEAR STAMP

1970

HPW 991

DO NOT RETAIN FILES AND PAPERS UNNECESSARILY
RETURN THEM TO REGISTRY FOR B.U. OR P.A.

PART

1970
YEAR
STAMP

FILE No. J 1/8

USEFUL INFORMATION RELATED TO CONTENTS OF THIS FILE

TRANSFERS

FOLIOS 15 + 16 — LYBIA/FEDAYEN FILE

LAST FILE: _____

NEXT FILE: _____

OTHER RELATED FILES: _____

CONFIDENTIAL

CYBER/CAT A

PRIORITY AMMAN TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TEL 328

25 JUNE 1970

①

TOP

COPY

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10

24 JUN 1970

NEJ118

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 328 DATED 23 JUNE 1970 REPEATED
FOR INFORMATION ROUTINE TO CAIRO BEIRUT ALGIERS KHARTOUM TRIPOLI
TEL AVIV BAGHDAD.

JORDAN: ARAB COMMITTEE:

Handwritten signature and initials
24/6

KING HUSSEIN AND THE JORDANIAN PRIME MINISTER RETURNED
FROM LIBYA ON 22 JUNE. AT THE AIRPORT, THE PRIME MINISTER
ANNOUNCED THAT THE ARAB LEADERS HAD DISCUSSED THE SITUATION IN
JORDAN AND HAD SET UP A JOINT COMMITTEE COMPRISING:-

(A) LAYED AHMED (ALGERIAN NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT, REPRESENTATIVE
OF BOUMEDIENNE AT THE TRIPOLI MEETINGS).

(B) DR. HASSAN SABRI AL-KHAWLI (UAR).

(C) MAJOR MANOUN AWAD ABU ZEID (MEMBER OF THE SUDANESE
REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND COUNCIL).

(D) A REPRESENTATIVE OF LIBYA.

2. THE COMMITTEE WAS CHARGED WITH THE TASK OF WORKING FOR
HIGH NATIONAL INTERESTS IN A WAY WHICH WOULD ENSURE THE SOVEREIGNTY
OF THE COUNTRY (JORDAN) AND SAFEGUARD FREEDOM OF STRUGGLE AND
SACRIFICE (THE WORD FEDAYEEN MEANS "SACRIFICERS").
ITS MEMBERS WILL ARRIVE IN AMMAN IN A FEW DAYS TIME.

3. THIS DEVICE OF A "COMMITTEE OF FOUR WISE MEN" WHO ARE
"REVOLUTIONARY" BUT NOT CLOSE NEIGHBOURS IS CLEARLY DESIGNED
TO STRENGTHEN THE HAND OF MODERATES ON BOTH SIDES. AS A SHORT
TERM PACIFYING MEASURE, IT SEEMS A GOOD IDEA, BUT THE PROOF OF

/THIS

See f ③

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

THIS WILL DEPEND ON WHETHER IT CAN DEVISE MACHINERY WITHIN JORDAN TO CONTROL FEDAYEEN/PALACE MUTUAL SUSPICIONS AND APPREHENSIONS IN THE LONGER TERM.

FCO PASS ROUTINE ALGIERS AND KHARTOUM

SIR P ADAMS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N.E.D.

N.A.D.

ARAB. D.

U.N.D.

P.U.S.D.

NEWS D.

MOD INT.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TOP COPY
②

CYBER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE AMMAN

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO 338

25 JUNE 1970.

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 338 DATED 25 JUNE 1970 REPEATED NEJI/8
FOR INFORMATION TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON CAIRO AND TEL AVIV AND
ROUTINE TO PARIS MOSCOW UKMIS NEW YORK ALGIERS KHARTOUM
TRIPOLI AND BEIRUT.

M.I.P.T. (NOT TO ALL): JORDAN: ARAB COMMITTEE.

26/6

KING HUSSEIN TOLD ME ON 24 JUNE THAT HE WAS ON THE WHOLE
SATISFIED WITH THE OUTCOME OF THE TRIPOLI MEETING AND IN
PARTICULAR WITH THE APPOINTMENT OF THE COMMITTEE OF FOUR. BUT
HE ADDED THAT A MAJORITY OF THE COMMITTEE WERE LIKELY TO TAKE
THE LINE THAT A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT WAS NO LONGER POSSIBLE AND
THAT THIS WOULD MAKE OBVIOUS DIFFICULTIES FOR JORDAN AND HIMSELF.

2. IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION THE KING SAID THAT BOTH HE AND THE
FEDAYEEN LEADERSHIP REGARDED THEMSELVES AS COMMITTED IN ADVANCE
TO ACCEPTING THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE. THESE WOULD
DEAL WITH THE RESTORATION OF LAW AND ORDER IN JORDAN AND WITH
THE UNIFICATION AND ORGANISATION OF THE PALESTINE RESISTANCE
MOVEMENT. HE ADDED THAT THE WRIT OF THE COMMITTEE WOULD RUN ALSO
IN LEBANON.

3. AS TO THE INTERNAL SITUATION, KING HUSSEIN SAID THAT THE MOST
DIFFICULT THING HE HAD EVER HAD TO DO WAS TO RESTRAIN THE ARMY
DURING THE RECENT DISTURBANCES. PRACTICALLY EVERY MILITARY UNIT
IN THE AMMAN AREA HAD BEEN DELIBERATELY PROVOKED BY FEDAYEEN
EXTREMISTS AND IT HAD BEEN ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO PREVENT THE ARMY
FROM STRIKING BACK. HE HAD SINCE THEN PERSONALLY VISITED MOST
UNITS AND DONE HIS BEST TO CALM THEM DOWN. HE WAS HOPEFUL THAT
THE PRESENT LULL WOULD CONTINUE BUT CLEARLY RATED THE CAPABILITY
(AND PERHAPS THE INTENTION) OF THE EXTREMISTS TO MAKE FURTHER
TROUBLE FAIRLY HIGH.

4. HE WAS ALIVE TO THE RISK THAT ARAFAT MIGHT BE UNDER PRESSURE
TO MOVE TOWARDS THE LEFT OR RISK GOING UNDER AS A TRAITOR TO THE
PALESTINIAN CAUSE. SOME PROGRESS WAS BEING MADE IN THE JOINT

/GOVERNMENT

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

GOVERNMENT/FEDAYEEN COMMITTEE BUT NOT FAST ENOUGH. HOWEVER, HE INTENDED TO FORM A NEW GOVERNMENT WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS AND THIS MIGHT GIVE IT A FRESH IMPETUS. I GATHERED THAT THE MEN HE HAD IN MIND FOR THE NEW GOVERNMENT WOULD BE SOME OF THOSE WHO HAD WORKED UNDER WASFI TEL IN THE PAST AND THAT WASFI (WHO IS CURRENTLY NON GRATA TO THE FEDAYEEN) WOULD PROBABLY BE

PULLING THE STRINGS FROM OUTSIDE. HE MENTIONED ABDEL WAHAB MAJALI AS A POSSIBLE PRIME MINISTER.

5. TURNING TO HIS RELATIONS WITH THE PALESTINIANS THE KING SAID THAT HE HAD MADE IT CLEAR TO INDIVIDUALS AND TO THE OTHER ARAB HEADS OF STATE THAT HE HAD NO INTENTION OF TRYING TO RE-IMPOSE HIS RULE IN THE OLD FORM ON TERRITORIES FROM WHICH THE ISRAELIS MIGHT WITHDRAW. BUT IN ORDER THAT THE ARAB CASE MIGHT BE PRESENTED MOST STRONGLY HE INTENDED TO HOLD UNTIL A SETTLEMENT THE POSITION THAT BOTH BANKS OF THE RIVER WERE INCLUDED IN THE STATE OF JORDAN. ANY EARLIER PRONOUNCEMENT OF HIS READINESS TO SEE AN AUTONOMOUS OR FEDERATED STATE SET UP ON THE WEST BANK WOULD ENCOURAGE THE ISRAELIS TO CREATE A PUPPET GOVERNMENT IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORY, WHICH WOULD THENCE FORWARD BE CUT OFF FROM THE MAIN BODY OF THE ARAB NATION.

6. THE KING SEEMED TO RECOGNISE THAT HIS POSITION IN THE COUNTRY WILL NEED IN ANY CASE TO BE RE-THOUGHT AND HE WAS FAR FROM OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE FUTURE. BUT HE INDICATED THAT HE HAD NO INTENTION OF USING FORCE UNLESS SEVERELY PROVOKED AND THAT HE STILL HAD HOPES OF REACHING A REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION WITH THE FEDAYEEN LEADERSHIP. HE HOPED THAT A NEW GOVERNMENT HERE AND THE OPERATION OF THE FOUR-MAN COMMITTEE WOULD HELP IN THIS PROCESS.

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON AND ROUTINE TO PARIS UKMIS NEW YORK ALGIERS AND KHARTOUM.

SIR P ADAMS

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N.E.D.

N.A.D.

ARAB. D.

E.E.S.D.

AMER. D.

U.N.D.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

[COPIES PASSED TO NO.10 DOWNING ST. & TO SIR R. HOOPER, CABINET OFFICE].

CONFIDENTIAL

W (3)

SECRETARY GENERAL
FLI AMMAN
TELENO. 287

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
14 JUNE, 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

IN ACTION
NET 114

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 287 (140840Z) DATED 14 JUNE 1970
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO IMMEDIATE MOD DI4 JIS (NE) JIS GULF
HQBFNE BEIRUT CAIRO TEL AVIV BAGHDAD TRIPOLI WASHINGTON AND
UKMIS NEW YORK.

MY TEL NO 280: INTERNAL SITUATION REPORT.

CONDITIONS IN THE TOWN ARE SLOWLY IMPROVING AND BANKS AND
MORE SHOPS ARE OPENING.

2. THE MAIN RISKS TO STABILITY ARE NOW REPRESENTED BY DIS-
AFFECTED TROOPS AND/OR UNITS WHO ARE STILL LOYAL TO SHERIF NASSER
AND BY LEFT-WING EXTREMISTS.

A SERIOUS BREAKDOWN IN THE CEASEFIRE WAS NARROWLY AVERTED YESTERDAY
AFTERNOON WHEN AN ARMY BRIGADE MOVED TOWARDS THE TOWN WITH THE
EVIDENT INTENTION OF ATTACKING THE WANDAT CAMP. THEY
WERE STOPPED ONLY BY THE PERSONAL INTERVENTION ON THE SPOT OF
THE CHIEF-OF-STAFF.

3. AMMAN RADIO ANNOUNCED LATER THAT KING HUSSEIN
HAD APPOINTED THE CHIEF-OF-STAFF, ARAFAT, VICE-PRISIDENT AMMASH OF
IRAQ AND FOREIGN MINISTER BOUTAFLIQA OF ALGERIA TO ADVISE HIM ON
THE SOLUTION OF THE CRISIS. ONE OF HIS OBJECTS, WE ASSUME
WAS TO TURN THE FLANK OF THE LEFT-WING OF THE
FEDAYEEN BY ASSOCIATING MODERATE AND HIGHLY RESPECTED LOCAL
LEADERS (JORDANIAN AND PALESTINIAN) WITH TWO ARAB LEADERS WITH
IMPECCABLE REVOLUTIONARY CREDENTIALS. IT ALSO CONSTITUTES A MOVE
BY THE KING TO GET HIMSELF BACK INTO THE CENTRAL BALANCING POSITION.
A JOINT WORKING PARTY HAS BEEN SET UP TO GET MUNICIPAL AND OTHER
PUBLIC SERVICES WORKING AGAIN AND PASC ARE REPORTED TO BE CALLING
IN CAPTURED CARS.

CONFIDENTIAL

/4.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

4. THE GENERAL MOOD OF THE PEOPLE IS NERVOUS, AND WHEN SO MANY ARE DEPRIVED OR HAVE LOST THEIR POSSESSIONS THERE ARE BOUND TO BE AT LEAST OCCASSIONAL OUTBREAKS OF VIOLENCE. THE BEST ONE CAN SAY IS THAT LIKELIHOOD OF SUCH OUTBREAKS ESCALATING INTO A GENERAL CONFRONTATION HAVE BEEN REDUCED.

5. COMMUNICATIONS. TELEX AND TELEGRAPH SERVICES ARE OPEN BUT WITH SOME DELAY OF TRAFFIC. AMMAN AIRPORT CONTRARY TO B B C HAS REMAINED OPEN.

DEFCONCEN PAS IMMEDIATE TO MOD DIA JIS(NE) JIS GULF AND HQBFNE

FCO PAS IMMEDIATE DEFCONCEN WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

SIR P. ADAMS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

[SENT TO D.C.C.]

FCO/WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

N.E.D.

PERSONNEL SERVICES DEPT.

COPIES TO :

A.S. FAIR, ESQ., O.D.M., ELAND HOUSE

J. ASHWOOD, ESQ. CREO., B.O.T.

CONFIDENTIAL

GGGGG

CYPHER CAT/A

ROUTINE CAIRO

TELEGRAM NO 739

CONFIDENTIAL

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

25 JUNE 1970

TOP COPY

3

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELNO 739 OF 25 JUNE RPTD FOR INFO TO ROUTINE AMMAN BEIRUT TRIPOLI TEL AVIV BAGHDAD ALGIERS KHARTOUM AND WASHINGTON.

AMMAN TELNO 328

.. JORDAN COMMITTEE.

THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR HERE WAS TOLD AT THE HEIGHT OF THE CRISIS IN JORDAN THAT THE EGYPTIANS HAD PLANNED TO SEND MAHMUD FAWZI AND SAMI SHARAF OF THE PRESIDENCY TO AMMAN ON A MEDIATION MISSION, BUT THAT THEY HAD CONCLUDED THAT THERE WERE ALREADY TOO MANY FINGERS IN THE PIE (PRESUMABLY A REFERENCE AT LEAST TO THE IRAQI AND POSSIBLY ALSO TO THE ALGERIAN ADVISER REFERRED TO IN AMMAN TELNO 287).— W ③

2. THE COMPOSITION OF THE NEW COMMITTEE REPORTED IN AMMAN TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE IS A VERY DIFFERENT MATTER AND THE EGYPTIANS MAY BE PRESUMED TO HAVE AT LEAST A MAJORITY SAY IN THE WAY IT PROCEEDS. I IMAGINE THAT BOTH THE EGYPTIANS AND KING HUSSEIN, AND POSSIBLY ARAFAT ALSO (COMPARE PARA 3 OF AMMAN TELNO 287) WILL BE HAPPY TO SEE THE IRAQIS AND SYRIANS EXCLUDED.

FCO PLEASE PASS ROUTINE ALGIERS KHARTOUM AND WASHINGTON.

MR. STEWART

[REPRINTED AS REQUESTED]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION:

N.EASTERN D.
N.AFR.D.
ARAB.D.
U.N.D.
P.U.S.D.
NEWS D.
N.O.D.(INT.)

CONFIDENTIAL

DDDDD

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 26 JUN 1970
DET 118

EN CLAIR

ROUTINE CAIRO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 753

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

29 JUNE 1970

TOP COPY (4)

UNCLASSIFIED

ADDSD TO FCO TELNO. 753 DATED 29/6/70 REPEATED FOR INFO
TO AMMAN, TRIPOLI AND KHARTOUM.
REPEATED SAVING TO WASHINGTON, TEL AVIV, BEIRUT, BAGHDAD
AND ALGIERS.

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 30 JUN 1970 NEJ 1/8
--

MY TELEGRAM NO. 739

f(3)

pr
3.16

JORDAN COMMITTEE

PRESS TODAY REPORTS THAT THE UAR, SUDANESE AND LIBYAN
MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ARE MEETING IN CAIRO BEFORE FLYING
TO AMMAN TODAY TO JOIN THE ALGERIAN MEMBER WHO IS ALREADY
DTHERE.

2. ALTHOUGH THE PRESS YESTERDAY STILL DESCRIBED THE
LIBYAN MEMBER AS JALLUD, TODAY'S PRESS REPORTS THAT LIBYA
WILL BE REPRESENTED BY MAJOR MUHAMMAD NAJM.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO WASHINGTON, TEL AVIV, BEIRUT,
BAGHDAD AND ALGIERS.
MR. STEWART

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION:

N.EASTERN D.	P.U.S.D.
N.AFR.D.	NEWS D.
ARAB.D.	
U.N.D.	M.O.D.(INT.)

DDDDDD

LAST REF.	
NEXT REF.	

ENCLAIR

PRIORITY AMMAN

TELEGRAM NO. 355

TO F C O
30 JUNE 1970.

NEJ 118.

UNCLASSIFIED.

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 355 DATED 29 JUNE 1970 REPEATED FOR
INFORMATION TO CAIRO, TRIPOLI, KHARTOUM, BEIRUT.

OURTEL 338 AND TRIPOLI TEL 1016 TO FCO.

FOUR-MAN ARAB COMMITTEE.

TODAYS PRESS REPORTS THAT HASAN SABRI AL KHAWLI (UAR),
MAJOR MAHMOUD AWAD AND FOUAD (SUDAN) AND MAJOR MOHAMMED NAJIB (LIBYA)
ARRIVED IN AMMAN ON 29 JUNE. THEY WILL HAVE TALKS WITH A
GOVERNMENT DELEGATION LED BY THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER, ABDUL MUHAMMAD
AL-RIFAI, AND WITH A FUDAYSEN DELEGATION LED BY YASIR ARAFAT.

SIR P ADAMS [COPIES SENT TO NO.10 DOWNING ST AND SIR R. HOOPER
CABINET OFFICE]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N.E.D.

N.A.D.

ARABIAN DEPT

E.E.S.D.

AMERICAN DEPT

U.N.D.

TOP COPY (6)

DECLAIR

PRIORITY AMMAN

TELEGRAM NO 363

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

4 JULY 1970

RECEIVED IN

REGISTRY No. 10

UNCLASSIFIED

ADDRESSED TO FCO TEL NO 353 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO
CAIRO ALGIERS TRIPOLI KHARTOUM AND BEIRUT.

NET 118

OUR TEL NO 355 OF 30 JUNE: FOUR-MAN ARAB COMMITTEE.

THE COMMITTEE HAS BEEN MEETING DELEGATIONS REPRESENTING
THE GOVERNMENT, THE FEDAYEEN AND SULIMAN HAFULSI'S NATIONAL
GROUPING SEPARATELY DURING THE PAST FEW DAYS, ON A SORT OF
RHODES FORMULA PRINCIPLE. THE ALGERIAN, LAYED ARBED HAS BEEN
APPOINTED CHAIRMAN OF THE GROUP, BUT IS NOW REPORTED TO BE
RETURNING TO ALGERIA FOR A FEW DAYS TO ATTEND THE INDEPENDENCE
DAY CELEBRATIONS. THERE IS SO FAR NO INDICATION OF HOW LONG
THE COMMITTEE WILL STAY IN AMMAN.

2. KAMAL NASSER, OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
OF THE FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT, SAID AFTER THE FEDAYEEN MEETING
WITH THE FOUR MAN COMMITTEE, THAT THE LATTER HAD EXPLAINED
THAT THEY DID NOT SEEK TO HARM ANYONE'S DIGNITY, SOVEREIGNTY
OR RIGHTS. PRESS COMMENT ON THE COMMITTEE'S VISIT HAS BEEN
SYMPATHETIC, AND HAS URGED ALL CONCERNED TO COOPERATE. THERE
SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN NO RELUCTANCE BY ANY OF THE PARTIES TO
EXPLAIN THEIR POINT OF VIEW TO THE FOUR-MAN COMMITTEE.

SIR P ADAMS

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N. E. D.

N. A. D.

ARABIAN DEPT


E. E. S. D.

AMERICAN DEPT

U. N. D.

NEWS DEPT

CONFIDENTIAL





British Embassy,
Cairo.

⑦

1/7

26 June, 1970.



P ③.

Dear Department,

NE

Would you please refer to Cairo telegram No. 739 of 25 June about the Jordan Committee. The reference in that telegram to Mahmud Fawzi was based on a misunderstanding. The Egyptians are in fact said to have planned to send General Muhammad Fawzi (the Minister of War) and not Dr. Mahmud Fawzi (President Nasser's Adviser on Foreign Affairs).

Yours ever,

Chancery.

Rn

[But they ^{sent} Hassan ~~Sader~~ al Khouli]

North African Department,
Foreign & Commonwealth Office,
S.W.1.

Pr

Copies to:

Chanceries Amman
Tripoli
Benghazi
Khartoum
Beirut
Tel Aviv
Algiers
Washington

Extr 7/7
NEED to see
PA
3.7

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10

INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE
NEJ 118

Cutting dated - 3 JUL 1970

, 19

To Resolve Guerrilla Issue

4-Power Arab Mediation Unit Holds 1st Meeting in Jordan

By Jesse W. Lewis Jr.

AMMAN, July 1 (WP).—A four-power Arab committee held its first formal session here today to mediate Jordan's chronic government-guerrilla problem.

The committee, composed of ranking officials from Egypt, Algeria, Libya and the Sudan, met with a government delegation led by Jordan's new prime minister, Abdul Moneim Rifai. Another session with guerrilla leaders is scheduled for tomorrow.

While the immediate task of the committee is to try to find a way for the government and the guerrillas to exist side-by-side without

recurring outbreaks of violence, the wider issue at stake is the future of King Hussein and the Palestinian guerrilla movement and the role each will play in the Arab-Israel conflict.

King Hussein, although dismayed with efforts to find a political solution to the conflict, still accepts in principle the 1957 Security Council resolution that calls for Israeli withdrawal and recognition of Israel's right to exist.

The Palestinian guerrillas reject any settlement of the Middle East conflict that includes the Jewish state of Israel. Instead, their policy statements say, Israel as now constituted must be dissolved and replaced with a Palestinian state in which Jews and Arabs would live.

A top official of el-Fatah, the largest guerrilla organization, in a recorded statement on the group's radio, said last night that Jordan must reject the idea of a peaceful settlement in order to have domestic tranquility.

Because of their political and military strength inside Jordan, the guerrillas virtually have the power to veto any policy decision by King Hussein.

The mediation committee was formed last month during a meeting in Tripoli, Libya, of the heads of state of Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and Libya and senior officials from Algeria, Tunisia and Sudan.

Prompted by Violence

The meeting was called in the wake of Jordan's latest outbreak of violence on June 7, when in six days of fighting more than 1,000 persons were killed and wounded.

Guerrilla leaders have expressed apprehension that the committee was formed to control them.

The committee begins its mission in a much calmer atmosphere than has prevailed in Jordan in recent weeks. Since the end of the fighting, King Hussein has made several concessions that appear to have eased tensions in his country.

The most significant change was the formation of a new government last Saturday that includes seven Palestinians and several East Bank Jordanians who are known for their pro-guerrilla sympathies.

The 17-man cabinet is headed by Premier Rifai, a former foreign minister and deputy prime minister. The king also has ordered dissolution of the army's "special branch," a counter-intelligence unit for internal security that has been anathema to the guerrillas.

The draft also has been abolished. Some guerrilla leaders feel that the king has not done enough. The leader of the Action Organization for the Liberation of Palestine, Dr. Issam Sartawi, a heart surgeon by training, charged today that "there's still an anti-revolutionary campaign being waged by the government."

(From yesterday's late editions.)

CWL

(8) (2)

21 enter

717

pr

um

8/7

CYPHER CAT/A
PRIORITY AMMAN
TELEGRAM NO 371

CONFIDENTIAL

TOP COPY (9)
TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
7 JULY 1970.

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 371 DATED 7 JULY 1970 REPEATED FOR
INFORMATION TO ROUTINE CAIRO, ALGIERS, TRIPOLI, KHARTOUM, BEIRUT,
SAVING TO UKHIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON.

BY TELEGRAM NO 363 (NOT TO ALL):

FOUR MAN COMMITTEE.

WHEN RECEIVING ALL NON-ARAB HEADS OF MISSION TOGETHER THIS
MORNING, THE NEW JORDANIAN MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS SAID THAT
THE FOUR-MAN COMMITTEE HAD NOW REACHED THE BROAD LINES OF AGREEMENT
WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GOVERNMENT AND THE FEDAYEEN. SOME
MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE HAD RETURNED TO THEIR OWN COUNTRIES BUT
WOULD BE IN AMMAN AGAIN ON 9 JULY WHEN, IT WAS HOPED, A FULL
AGREEMENT ON A MODUS VIVENDI COULD BE SIGNED.

2. INFORMATION FROM OTHER SOURCES INDICATES THAT THERE ARE STILL
SOME DIFFICULTIES TO BE ironed OUT AND CLEARLY AGREEMENT CANNOT
YET BE COUNTED UPON. BUT THE MINISTER (WHO HAS BEEN TAKING A
PERSONAL PART IN NEGOTIATIONS) SPOKE FAIRLY OPTIMISTICALLY.

FCO PASS ROUTINE TO ALGIERS AND KHARTOUM AND SAVING TO UKHIS NEW
YORK AND WASHINGTON



SIR P ADAMS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N.E.D.
N.A.D.
ARABIAN DEPT
E.E.S.D.
AMERICAN DEPT
U.N.D.
NEWS DEPT

CONFIDENTIAL



EN CLAIR

PRIORITY AMMAN

TELEGRAM NO 374

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

9 JULY 1978

UNCLASSIFIED.

NEJ 1/8

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 374 DATED 9 JULY 1978 REPEATED FOR
INFORMATION TO ROUTINE CAIRO ACCIERS TRIPOLI KHARTOUM BEIRUT AND
TEL AVIV.

FOUR-MAN ARAB COMMITTEE.

THE SUDANESE AND EGYPTIAN MEMBERS OF THE FOUR-MAN ARAB COMMITTEE
HAVE LEFT AMMAN FOR THEIR RESPECTIVE COUNTRIES TO REPORT TO
THEIR GOVERNMENTS. THEY ARE DUE TO RETURN AT THE END OF THIS
WEEK WHEN AN OFFICIAL STATEMENT ON THE RESULTS OF THEIR TALKS
WILL BE ISSUED.

2. THE LOCAL PRESS OF 8 JULY SPECULATED THAT AN AGREEMENT HAD
BEEN REACHED, AND THAT IT WOULD COVER SAFEGUARDS FOR THE FREEDOM
OF ACTION OF THE FEDAYEEN, AND THE REMOVAL OF THE FACTORS WHICH
CAUSED THE RECENT CRISIS. IN AN INTERVIEW HAYEF HAWATMEH,
THE LEADER OF THE P.D.F.L.P. SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD FROM
MAJOR MOHAMMAD NAJJI, THE LIBYAN REPRESENTATIVE ON THE FOUR-MAN
COMMITTEE, THAT JORDANIAN MILITARY FORCES IN AND SURROUNDING
TOWNS WOULD BE WITHDRAWN, THAT ARMED AND UNARMED SPECIAL FORCES
WHICH WERE HOSTILE TO THE REVOLUTION WOULD BE DISSOLVED, AND
THAT THE JORDANIAN ADMINISTRATION WOULD BE PURGED BY REMOVING
ELEMENTS HOSTILE TO THE FEDAYEEN.

3. MAJOR NAJJI HIMSELF SAID THAT LIBYA WOULD UNDERTAKE TO PROVIDE
GUARANTEES SUFFICIENT TO PREVENT A REPETITION OF THE DEPLOABLE

/INCIDENTS

INCIDENTS OF JUNE. HE SAID THAT HE WAS OPTIMISTIC ABOUT REACHING A POSITIVE SETTLEMENT, BUT GAVE NO DETAILS OF ITS PROBABLE TERMS. CA'ED AMED (ALGERIA) IS QUOTED IN THE PRESS OF 9 JULY AS BEING OPTIMISTIC. THE NEWSPAPER "AL-BAYAN" OF 9 JULY QUOTES A SPOKESMAN FOR THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE (OF THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT) AS SAYING THAT IT IS ASSUMED THAT A FORMULA HAS BEEN AGREED UPON IN THE TALKS WITH THE GOVERNMENT AND THE FOUR-MAN COMMITTEE. THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE HAS APPROVED THIS FORMULA, BUT THE GOVERNMENT HAD NOT YET DONE SO. HE SAID "'IT SEEMS THAT THERE IS DIS-AGREEMENT REGARDING THE WORDING AND SOME POINTS. WE HOPE THAT WISDOM WILL PREVAIL'".

SIR P. ADAMS

FCO/WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION
H. EAST. DEPT.

GGGGG

Cutting dated 9 JUL 1970

.. 19

(11)
- WL

King Hussein shows reluctance

AMMAN, Wednesday. — An apparent reluctance by King Hussein to approve further concessions to the Palestinian commandos was reported today to be holding up the ratification of a peace formula drafted yesterday by an Arab mediation team.

The mediators from four Arab countries had produced a formula to settle the crisis between the King and the commandos which, according to one guerrilla chief, called on the King to pull his troops out of Jordanian cities and disband special armed units "hostile to the revolution."

Although the formula was originally expected to be officially announced yesterday, no statement has yet come from the Government or the commandos to ratify the agreement.

"Fatah," the Amman news-

paper published by the commandos, hinted today at Royal opposition to the mediators' formula when it reported that discussions undertaken by the mediators "on the highest levels" had failed to secure agreement.

Observers here said that if the formula provided for the disbandment of the Special Forces—the paratroop unit who form the elite of Jordan's internal security forces—the King's opposition was likely to be very stubborn.

The army newspaper, "Al-Aqsa," today printed a statement by the commander of the Special Forces, whom it did not name, denying that they were hostile to anyone but Israel or that they had taken orders from anyone but the armed forces general command.

The statement did not refer to the guerrillas' call for the disbandment of the Special Forces, which was one of their principal demands in the June

clashes which resulted in about 1000 casualties.

Well-informed sources said today that Jordanian "higher official authorities," whom the sources did not precisely identify, were continuing their study of the proposed formula and that an announcement on the formula had been postponed until these authorities had approved it.

"Fatah" also said that Mr Arafat, who as well as being supreme guerrilla commander is official spokesman of the Palestine National Liberation Movement had discussed several questions of great importance at a meeting with the group's military commanders yesterday.

Well-informed sources said that the final attitude of the Government and the commandos to the compromise formula would crystallise only after the members of the mediating team returned to Amman, where they are expected later today or tomorrow.—Reuter.

NE J 118

(10/17)

Box 131

Cutting dated 10 JUL 1970 ... 19

(12)

(15)

Hussein's officers oppose Jordan peace plan

By JOHN BULLOCH, in Beirut

TOUGH right wing officers in King Hussein's army were last night holding up the signing of the "agreement" designed by the four-nation conciliation committee to bring peace to Jordan. Senior army officers bluntly told the king that the concessions he was being asked to make went further than they or their men could stomach.

But the indications were that the king would overcome this opposition and would sign the agreement which seeks to reconcile the Jordanian Government and the commandoes.

If the 35-year-old monarch does not succeed in doing so, he knows he will plunge his country into civil war.

Sticking point for the Army commanders, many of them from the Bedouin tribes traditionally and fanatically loyal to the Hashemite throne, was the provision calling for military withdrawal from Amman, capital of Jordan.

They feared that if this was allowed, King Hussein might be left defenceless in his hilltop palace, which could be overrun before army reinforcements could move in.

In spite of these objections, the 16-point protocol worked out by the envoys of Algeria, Egypt, the Sudan and Libya, is likely to be signed today.

If King Hussein does not agree, his country will be back in the position it was last month — with the commandoes fighting the Government.

The agreement provides for withdrawal of Jordanian forces from the capital, non-interference with commando operations, and complete freedom of movement for the Fedayeen.

In return, the guerrillas promise merely to "tighten up" discipline.

NASSER IN TALKS


By Our Moscow Correspondent

President Nasser of Egypt, who has prolonged his Moscow visit for what are seen as key talks on Middle East developments, resumed his discussions with Mr Kosygin, the Russian Prime Minister, yesterday.

pr

um

13/1



(13)

Prospects bleak for peace in Jordan

From PAUL MARTIN

Beirut, July 9

After the first optimism, hopes that a lasting peace had been reached between the Jordan regime and the Palestinian guerrillas have subsided. Both sides have expressed doubts about the "formula for coexistence" discussed at their most recent meeting.

Indeed, the official Jordanian stand seems to be that no agreement has yet been reached. A promised communiqué announcing that the crisis had been settled through the auspices of the four-man Arab peace committee has so far failed to materialize.

Although the various versions of the peace formula which have been leaked by the parties in the dispute contain many contradictions, it appears to be an attempt to preserve the interests of both sides. It calls for guarantees that the sovereignty of King Husain will be honoured and that the guerrillas will be allowed freedom of action from Jordanian territory. This in itself is a major contradiction.

According to most versions, the King would withdraw Jordanian forces from around Amman in return for a similar guerrilla withdrawal.

However, the King has shown himself to be dissatisfied with the guerrilla's promises that their "regular" forces would be withdrawn from inside the capital and has called for a total withdrawal of the guerrilla militia, the irregular force composed of part-time soldiers drawn from the refugee camps and the Palestinian population generally.

This is considered the most important point at issue because in the recent crisis the guerrilla militia played a bigger role in the Amman fighting than the regular commando force. Furthermore, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the marxist extremist group, has the most powerful militia in the Amman area.

Another stumbling block has been the guerrillas' insistence

that Jordanian armed forces disband all "agencies" hostile to them. The King feels that by dismissing his uncle, Major-General Sherif Nasser Bin Jamal, as commander-in-chief and dissolving the anti-guerrilla Special Bureau, he has gone as far as he can. He shows no inclination to take their hints that the special forces, the Army's guerrilla force, should be disbanded.

On the question of freedom of action from Jordanian territory, the King has demanded that the guerrillas coordinate their activities with the Army. This the guerrillas have refused to do, claiming that the very nature of their activities requires that they remain a separate entity.

What has further complicated matters is the dissatisfaction inside the ranks of the Jordan Army. This was reflected in King Husain's recent pledge to his troops that he would not make any concessions undermining the authority of the state or the Army.

Meanwhile the guerrillas' suspicion of the four-man committee commissioned to settle the crisis has not softened. They particularly distrust Mr. Kaid Ahmed, the Algerian representative, who has said all guerrillas should be stationed along the ceasefire lines.

Jewish appeal to Russia

From Our Correspondent

Geneva, July 9

The World Jewish Congress, in a statement issued by its president, Dr. Nahum Goldmann, today appealed to the Soviet Union to "abstain from further military involvements" in the Middle East. It called on all the big powers to exert their influence and wisdom to avert a new catastrophe and to work towards conditions for a just settlement.

13/10

NE J 1/8

SECRET
NO. 377
11 JULY 1970

(14)

ADDRESSED TO THE TELETYPE UNIT DATED 11 JULY 1970 RELAYED FOR
INFORMATION TO THE TELETYPE UNIT DATED 11 JULY 1970 RELAYED FOR
BEIRUT TEL AVIV DIA HQBFNE.

FOUR MAN ARAB COMMITTEE.

REC'D
NE 51/8
13/7

A STATEMENT RECORDING THE AGREEMENT REACHED IN THE TALKS
BETWEEN THE FOUR MAN ARAB COMMITTEE, THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF
THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANISATION AND THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT
WAS SIGNED ON FRIDAY, 10 JULY (TEXT IN M.I.F.T.).

THE OBLIGATIONS IMPOSED ON THE GOVERNMENT BY THE AGREEMENT
ARE LESS SPECIFIC AND LESS NUMEROUS THAN THOSE IMPOSED ON THE
FEDAYEEN ORGANISATIONS.

2. THE EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR, WHO TOOK PART IN THE TALKS, ATTRIBUTED
THEIR SUCCESS TO THE SPIRIT OF COOPERATION ESTABLISHED BY
ABDUL MUNIM AREF AND SAMHOUR HABITHA THE CHIEF OF STAFF. HE WAS
REASONABLY CONFIDENT THAT THE LEADERS OF THE LEFT WING COMMUNIST
ORGANISATIONS, (WHO ARE ALL REPRESENTED ON THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE),

WAS COMMITTED TO THE AGREEMENT NOT SIMPLY ARABAT. HE MADE THE FURTHER POINT THAT THE MEMBERS OF THE FOUR-MAN COMMITTEE SIGNED THE STATEMENT NOT SIMPLY ON BEHALF OF THEIR OWN COUNTRIES, BUT ALSO ON BEHALF OF ALL THE COUNTRIES REPRESENTED AT THE TRIPOLI CONFERENCE.

DEFCONCEN PASS ROUTINE DIA AND HQBFNE

FCO PASS ROUTINE DEFCONCEN ALGIERS AND KHARTOUM

[CONT TO D.C.C.]
[REMARKS AT UNUSUAL]

... D.
... D.
... D.
... D.
... D.
... D.
... D.

CYPHER CAT/A

CONFIDENTIAL


(17)

IMMEDIATE ACTION

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO 378

11 JULY 1970.



CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED FCO TELEGRAM NO 378 DATED 11 JULY 1970 REPEATED FOR
INFORMATION ROUTE TO CAIRO BAGHDAD ALGIERS TRIPOLI KHARTOUM
BEIRUT TEL AVIV DI4 AND HQ BFNE.

M.I.P.T.


FOUR-MAN ARAB COMMITTEE.

17/7

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT.

AS A RESULT OF THE TALKS HELD BY THE FOUR-MAN ARAB COMMITTEE
WITH THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE JORDAN GOVERNMENT AND THE CENTRAL
COMMITTEE OF THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANISATION, THE FOLLOWING
BASES AND PRINCIPLES WERE AGREED.

1. THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE PLO IS THE BODY RESPONSIBLE FOR
ALL THE FEDAYEEN ORGANISATIONS, AND THEIR ACTIONS. THE GOVERN-
MENT WILL CONTACT THE COMMITTEE IN ALL MATTERS RELATING TO
THE AFFAIRS, ACTIONS, RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF FEDAYEEN
ORGANISATIONS.
2. COMMITMENTS BY THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE TO THE GOVERNMENT WILL
BE BINDING ON ALL FEDAYEEN ORGANISATIONS, AND COMMITMENTS BY
THE GOVERNMENT TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE WILL APPLY TO ALL
FEDAYEEN ORGANISATIONS.



/3.

CONFIDENTIAL

3. THE GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES THE FREEDOM OF ACTION AND SECURITY OF THE FEDAYEEN ORGANISATIONS AND THEIR RIGHT OF POPULAR MOBILISATION TO THE EXTENT THAT THESE DO NOT VIOLATE THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE STATE.
4. THE COURAGEOUS JORDANIAN ARMED FORCES, WHICH CONFRONT THE ENEMY WITH DETERMINATION AND FOLLOW THE PATHWAY TO SACRIFICE AND HONOUR IN ORDER TO RECOVER THE USURPED HOMELAND, ARE A BASIC SUPPORT OF THE ARAB MILITARY FORCES. THE JORDANIAN ARMED FORCES AND THE RESISTANCE FORCES ARE UNITED IN THE JOINT STRUGGLE OF STEADFASTNESS AND LIBERATION.
5. PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE IS A NATIONAL STRUGGLE AND IS ONE OF THE BASIC REQUIREMENTS OF OUR FIGHT AGAINST AGGRESSION AND FOR LIBERATION. FOR THIS REASON, IT MUST BE SUPPORTED AND ESCALATED.

IN IMPLEMENTING THE ABOVE PRINCIPLES THE GOVERNMENT WILL TAKE THE FOLLOWING MEASURES:-

1. THE GOVERNMENT WILL CANCEL ALL EXCEPTIONAL STEPS AND MEASURES TAKEN DURING THE CRISIS.
2. THE GOVERNMENT WILL SUPPORT THE ARMED STRUGGLE IN THE FIGHT FOR LIBERATION AND THE WRESTING BACK OF RIGHTS FROM THE USURPING ENEMY AND WILL TAKE ALL MEASURES TO ENSURE SOLIDARITY BETWEEN THE JORDANIAN ARMED FORCES AND THE ARMED STRUGGLE OF THE FORCES OF THE PALESTINE REVOLUTION IN THE PATH OF LIBERATION.
3. INFORMATION MEDIA WILL BE MOBILISED TO SERVE THE AIMS OF THE PALESTINE REVOLUTION, THE PEOPLE, AND THE ARMED FORCES, AND TO MAINTAIN MORALE.

CONFIDENTIAL

AMMAN TELNO 378 TO FCO

- 3 -

4. THE GOVERNMENT WILL GUARANTEE THAT NO ORGANISATION OR ELEMENT WILL ACT AGAINST THE INTERESTS OF THE PALESTINE REVOLUTION OR AGAINST NATIONAL UNITY.

THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE WILL ABIDE BY THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES AND ORGANISATIONAL MEASURES:-

- (A) MILITARY DEMONSTRATIONS WILL BE PROHIBITED AS WILL THE PRESENCES OF ARMED FEDAYEEN IN PUBLIC PLACES (COFFEE HOUSES, CINEMAS, HOTELS, RESTAURANTS, PARKS, GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS AND LAW COURTS), WITH THE EXCEPTION OF SPECIAL GUARDS ON OFFICES AND LEADING PERSONALITIES.
- (B) ALL RESISTANCE VEHICLES SHOULD CARRY SPECIAL REGISTRATION PLATES AND STOP AT CHECK POINTS IF ASKED TO DO SO. IN THE EVENT OF ANY DISPUTE AT A CHECK POINT, THE RESPONSIBLE OFFICER OF THE MILITARY POLICE OF THE PLA WILL SETTLE THE DISPUTE IN COOPERATION WITH THE OFFICER IN CHARGE OF THE CHECK POINT.
- (C) THE MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES, SECURITY FORCES AND THE FEDAYEEN ALL BELONG TO ONE NATION AND ARE BROTHERS-IN-ARMS. THEY SHOULD PRESERVE EACH OTHERS HONOUR AND DIGNITY AND SHOULD ACT TO PROMOTE BROTHERLY RELATIONS BETWEEN EACH OTHER.
- (D) SHOOTING, MILITARY MANOEUVRES AND TRAINING WITH AMMUNITION WITHIN CITIES AND POPULATED AREAS ARE STRICTLY FORBIDDEN.

/(E)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 4 -

(E) MILITARY BASES OF THE FEDAYEEN ORGANISATIONS WITH THE EXCEPTION OF BASES OF THEIR POPULAR RESISTANCE FORCES, ARE PROHIBITED WITHIN THE CITIES. THE STORAGE OF EXPLOSIVES, AMMUNITION AND HEAVY ARMS IN POPULATED AREAS IS PROHIBITED. THE PLACES WHERE SUCH EQUIPMENT SHALL BE STORED WILL BE AGREED BY A JOINT COMMITTEE FROM THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE JORDANIAN ARMED FORCES, AND THE H.Q. OF THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ARMY.

(F) ALL FEDAYEEN ORGANISATIONS WILL RESPECT AND ABIDE BY ALL THE RULES, REGULATIONS AND LAWS IN FORCE IN THE KINGDOM, AND ALL MEMBERS OF THE RESISTANCE WHO VIOLATE CIVIL LAWS AND REGULATIONS WILL BE HANDED OVER TO THE COMPETENT JORDANIAN AUTHORITIES.

(G) NO SOLDIER WHO IS SERVING IN THE JORDAN ARMED FORCES WILL BE ACCEPTED BY THE FEDAYEEN ORGANISATIONS.

2. IT WAS ALSO AGREED TO FORM A JOINT COMMITTEE TO SUPERVISE THE CARRYING OUT THE ABOVE AGREEMENT, TO RECEIVE REPORTS ON VIOLATIONS AND TO DEAL WITH NEW DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF NATIONAL UNITY AND NATIONAL INTERESTS.

/3.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AMMAN TELNO 378 TO FCO

- 5 -

3. IT WAS ALSO AGREED THAT THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF ENQUIRY WILL CONTINUE ITS INVESTIGATIONS TO DISCOVER WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE RECENT DEPLORABLE EVENTS.

DEFCONCEN PASS ROUTINE DI4 AND HQBFNE

FCO PASS ROUTINE DEFCONCEN ALGIERS AND KHARTOUM

SIR P. ADAMS

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/
/SENT TO D.C.C./

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N.E.D.
N.A.D.
ARABIAN D.
E.E.S.D.
AMERICAN D.
U.N.D.
DEFENCE D.
NEWS D.
RESEARCH D. (SOVIET SECTION)
" (AMERICAN SECTION)

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A

ROUTINE ALGIERS

TELEGRAM NO. 247

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

16 JULY 1973

18

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO FC O TELNO 247 OF 16 JULY REPEATED FOR
INFORMATION AMMAN.

RECEIVED
REGISTRY NO. 101

AMMAN TELEGRAM NUMBER 378.

(17)

NE 1/8

FOR THE COMMITTEE.

(copy to) NE 1/1
- N/R - F (20)

17/7

MOHAMED YAZID (MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 198) TOLD ME YESTERDAY:

(A) THAT THE COMMITTEE REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH
2 OF AMMAN TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE WILL BE COMPOSED
OF THE AMBASSADORS IN AMMAN OF THE FOUR COUNTRIES CONSTIT-
UTING THE COMMITTEE=

(B) THAT THE PALESTINIANS WISH KING HUSSEIN TO REMAIN ON
THE THRONE QUOTE AT PRESENT UNQUOTE. WHEN THEY NO LONGER
WISH IT QUOTE HE WILL GO UNQUOTE.

F C O PASS ROUTINE TO AMMAN.

MR. LE CUESNE

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N.E.D.
N.A.D.
ARAB. DEPT.
E.E.S.D.
AMERICAN DEPT.
DEF. DEPT.
REC. DEPT. (SOVIET SECTION)
(AMERICAN SECTION)

(17)

GGGGG

NE 1/1 O/F.

CY, HER/CAT A

ROUTINE ALGIERS

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO. 198 . . . 6 JULY 1970

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO F C O TELNO 198 OF 6 JULY R F I TO AMMAN
CAIRO AND TUNIS.

MR. CARTER'S LETTER OF 5 JUNE TO MR. LONG.

FEDAYEEN.

MY FRENCH COLLEAGUE HAS TOLD ME THAT WHEN M. BOUTEFLIKA
RECEIVED M. COUVE DE MURVILLE (CURRENTLY VISITING
ALGERIA AS HIS GUEST) LAST WEEK, HE WAS OUTSPOKEN IN
CRITICISM OF WHAT HE HAD SEEN OF THE PALESTINIAN ORGANIS-
ATIONS IN AMMAN ON THE GROUNDS OF

(A) THEIR LACK OF STATESMANSHIP.

(B) THEIR PROPENSITY FOR INTERNECINE SQUABBLING

(C) THE EXTENT TO WHICH SOME OF THEM ARE PENETRATED
BY COMMUNISTS.

BASING HIMSELF ON ALGERIA'S OWN EXPERIENCE HE SAID THAT
THE URGENT IMMEDIATE REQUIREMENT IS TO ACHIEVE UNITY AMONG
THE DIFFERENT ORGANISATIONS AND A COMMON DEVOTION TO THE
PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVE.

/2. SINCE

CONFIDENTIAL

2. SINCE THE ALGERIANS HAVE PUT THEIR MONEY ON ARAFAT AND TO THE EXTENT THAT HE MAY BE REGARDED AS THE BEST OF THE BUNCH AMONG THE RIVAL LEADERS OF THE PALESTINIANS, IT MAY BE REASONABLE TO INFER FROM THIS THAT, FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE AT LEAST, ALGERIAN INFLUENCE ON THE COMMITTEE OF FOUR WILL BE DIRECTED TOWARDS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE AUTHORITY OF THE MODERATE RATHER THAN THE EXTREME WING AMONG THE PALESTINIANS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF A MODUS VIVENDI IN JORDAN.

3. SPECIFICALLY, I THINK IT QUITE LIKELY THAT THE ALGERIANS ARE ADVOCATING AN ARRANGEMENT SIMILAR TO THAT WHICH THEY WORKED OUT WITH THE TUNISIANS DURING THE WAR AGAINST THE FRENCH (PARAGRAPH 6 OF MR MACKENZIE'S TELEGRAM NUMBER 11 SAVING). KAID AHMED'S DEPUTY ON THE COMMITTEE OF FOUR, MOHAMED YAZID, WAS A MINISTER IN THE G P R A IN TUNIS FOR FOUR YEARS.

F C O PASS ROUTINE TO CAIRO AMMAN AND TUNIS.

MR. LE QUESNE

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

NR. EASTN D.

NTH AFR. D.

DEFENCE D.

P.U.S.D.

U.N.D.

I.P.D.

I.R.D.

NEWS D.

(i) ~~RD (MEF)~~
~~Assessment Staff~~
~~7/5~~ ~~DUTY~~

RESTRICTED



I wonder. R.E.

(ii) Mr Evans

This is rather reassuring

(iii) Fatt 16/7

Dear Christopher,

RECEIVED IN RYN 10
NE 5118

BRITISH EMBASSY,
AMMAN.

14 July, 1970

PA
From 3/7

Reactions to the 10 July Statement by the
Four-Man Arab Committee

The newspaper "Fatah" has in the past few days been giving prominence to comments by various Palestinian personalities and groups on the statement of the Four-Man Arab Committee, issued on 10 July, which constitutes the agreement between the Jordanian government and the fedayeen.

2. A spokesman for Sa'iqah, Abu Musa, is quoted as saying, "The agreement was reached with the approval of all members of the Central Committee..... We consider the statement as a partial success achieved by the resistance movement." He went on to say that the resistance movement must end the various abuses that have given the revolution a bad name, and the government must abolish "provocative machines and elements" that aim at the destruction of the revolution. A report from Damascus quotes Abu Musa as saying that some of the terms of the agreement were not, however, explicit enough. At the same time, the Sa'iqah weekly, "Saut al-Jamahir", warned that the revolution does not need to be licensed, and will not accept "guardianship" by anyone. Qualified approval, therefore, appears to be the Sa'iqah attitude.


3. An interview with George Habbash was published in "Fatah" on 13 July. His theme was unity. The P.F.L.P. would adhere to the resolutions of the Central Committee, in accordance with the agreement of 6 May (which first established the committee). A sound relationship between Fatah and the P.F.L.P. would be a major step towards national unity. He paid tribute to Fatah for its firm stand against attempts to divide the fedayeen movement. It was on the question of national unity that the P.F.L.P.'s attitude towards the statement of the Four-Man Committee rested. He called for a continuation of the struggle to foil future conspiracies and to achieve fedayeen demands. These he listed as the withdrawal of the army, the liquidation of "special machines" set up to strike at the revolution, the trial of those responsible for the events of November, 1968, and February and June, 1970, and the release of all fedayeen under arrest. The implication is, presumably, that in P.F.L.P. eyes, the agreement obliges the government to meet these demands. Nonetheless, the tone of much of what Habbash said was

/moderate

C. W. Long, Esq.,
N.E.D.,
F.C.O.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED



moderate, and it is clear that for the moment the P.F.L.P. is not going to be seen to be out of step.

4. In "Fatah" of 14 July, Ibrahim Bakr, a prominent member of Sulayman al-Bulsi's National Grouping, is quoted as saying that the achievement of the Four Men Committee was a success for the army, the people and the foreigner, because all concerned have the same interest - the liberation of Palestine.

Yours ever,

Jimmy Carter

(C. P. Carter)

c.c. Chanceries: Beirut
Cairo
Baghdad
Tel Aviv

RESTRICTED

CONFIDENTIAL

(20)

Mr. Perkins { to glance over
Miss [unclear] { this most
interesting letter.

1/1 // Reg. 1/1 Enter

b/ Send copies to: Assessment Staff, Cabinet Office;
D.I.4, M.O.D.;
Reserve Dept.;
P.D.

BRITISH EMBASSY,

AMMAN.

17 July, 1970

NEJ 118

c/ Resubmit to Mr. Evans to see 0/R 27/7

Dear Richard,

I enclose a copy of a revised translation of the statement issued by the Four-Man Arab Committee on 10 July, which recorded the agreement reached between the Jordan Government and the Central Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (our telegrams Nos. 377 and 378).

2. Perhaps the most significant aspect of the agreement is the fact that it was countersigned by the representatives of the U.A.R., Algeria, Libya and the Sudan, who in turn were acting on behalf of the states represented at the Tripoli conference. This is thus the first agreement between the Government and the fedayeen which has been underwritten by other Arab governments. There is, however, no suggestion that the other governments have given any formal guarantees, as was suggested by the Libyan representative (our telegram No. 374). Nor is there, as was once thought likely, any machinery for supervision of the agreement by other Arab states through their representatives in Amman.

3. In general it seems that the participation of the four Arab representatives benefited the King by removing him from too direct involvement in the processes of mediation. It seems that the Arab representatives themselves were able to speak plainly to the Central Committee, and that this helped to achieve an agreement that was better from the Jordan government point of view than once seemed possible.


4. The second important aspect of the agreement is the recognition of the Central Committee of the P.L.O. as the governing body for all fedayeen organisations. The formation of the Central Committee, which consists of the members of the P.L.O. executive committee, representatives of all the fedayeen organisations and a number of ex-officio I.L.O. officials and independents, was first agreed on in May, and it formally became the organ of the I.L.O. at the recent Palestine National Congress in Cairo. We saw it then as a device for including the more extremist fedayeen organisations in a body which would not in fact control the P.L.O. It has now emerged as something more important than that.

5. The text of the agreement itself is divided into three sections: a list of general principles is followed by the specific obligations imposed on the Jordanian Government and

/on

R. Evans, Esq.,
Near Eastern Dept.,
F.C.O.,
London, S.W.1.

CONFIDENTIAL




on the Central Committee. In the first section, in addition to the paragraphs dealing with the role of the Central Committee, there is a general obligation on the Government to ensure the freedom of action and security of the fedayeen, but only to the extent that the sovereignty of the state is not infringed. It is anybody's guess just what this will mean in practice, but it can clearly be used as an escape clause by the Government against fedayeen demands which they do not wish to meet.

6. The obligations imposed on the Government are somewhat vague. The provision that all emergency steps and measures taken during the crisis will be cancelled is likely to be interpreted by the fedayeen as meaning that troop reinforcements in and around Amman dating from the crisis, should be withdrawn. Similarly, the prohibition on organisations acting against the Palestine revolution is intended to prevent the Government from setting up any successor to Sherif Nasser's "special branch". Neither provision, however, would oblige the Government to meet the demands of Nayef Hawatmeh and Georges Habbash for the total withdrawal of Jordanian troops in and surrounding towns, and the purging of the administration of elements hostile to the fedayeen. The Government have in fact come off fairly lightly. ✓

7. The list of obligations imposed on the Central Committee are preceded by the statement that they "have already been published" and the fedayeen are putting it about that they have not agreed to anything which was not already in force. This claim is only partly true. It is correct to say that in substance paragraphs (a), (b), (c) and (d) repeat the Order of the Day issued by the Unified Command on 18 February after the February disturbances, but there are some interesting differences. The Government have now agreed that the ban on the carrying of arms in public places will not apply to special guards on fedayeen offices and leaders, and the fedayeen for their part have accepted the requirement that their vehicles should carry number plates, but these will be issued by the fedayeen organisations themselves not the government. (Both of these additions recognise existing practice.)

8. The ban on the storage of explosives in paragraph (e) comes from the government security regulations published in February, which were the cause of the disturbances in that month, and the prohibition on fedayeen military bases in towns is entirely new. The fedayeen popular resistance forces who are still allowed to have bases in towns, are a part-time militia and the Central Committee no doubt argued that they had to have bases reasonably close to where they lived and worked. The exception does, however, make it possible for the organisations to keep a military presence in the towns. The provision that the bases are to be defined by a Joint Committee of the General Staff and the fedayeen Command is a vague one - it is not clear whether these bases are those of the fedayeen militia in towns, of the fedayeen regular forces outside towns, or even the places where explosives and ammunition belonging to the fedayeen may be stored. One consequence of moving fedayeen military bases out of Amman will be that they are very much more exposed than at present to Israeli air attack. It will be interesting to see to what

CONFIDENTIAL



extent the fedayeen move out, and how long they stay.

9. Neither the obligation to observe Jordanian laws and to hand over offenders, nor the "no poaching" rule about recruiting in the army (paragraphs (f) and (g)) have previously been made public. But they both certainly formed part of the understandings between the fedayeen and the government which were reached in February, so cannot really be said to be new.

- - - 10. The Central Committee has now nominated its members on the Joint Committee to follow up the agreement (a complete list of its members is also enclosed). It is notable that both Georges Habbash and Nayef Nawatneh are to be members of the committee. The remainder are Abu Ayad, (Saleh Khalaf), the Deputy Leader of Fatah, Kamal Nasser, the P.L.O. spokesman, Brigadier Yahya, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Struggle Command, and Dafi Jan'ani of Sa'iqa. The appointment of both Habbash and Hawatneh looks like an ingenious move by Arafat to ensure that both are seen to be publicly committed to the agreement.

11. Although the fact that both sides managed to agree to the statement issued on 10 July was undoubtedly a step forward, there is still some difficult negotiating to be done as to how the agreement is to be implemented. Nayef Hawatneh, in an interview published in "Fatah" on 16 July, repeated his demand for the withdrawal of military forces in and around Amman and criticised the fact that the agreement did not clearly define the obligations of the Jordanian Government. For their part, the Government are very conscious of the difficulties they face.

12. Perhaps Lord Attlee's reply to a journalist who asked him how he felt on his 75th birthday best sums up the present state of affairs; "Not bad - considering the alternative."

Yours ever,

Christopher

(C. D. Lush)

c.c. Chanceries: Cairo
Baghdad
Algiers
Tripoli
Khartoum
Beirut
Tel Aviv

CONFIDENTIAL

Text of Statement Issued by the Four-Man Arab Committee
in Amman on 10 July, 1970 (Revised Translation)

As a result of the talks which the Committee has held with responsible persons in the Jordanian Government and with representatives of the Central Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, agreement has been reached on the following principles and bases:-

1. The Central Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organisation will have control over and will be responsible for all fedayeen organisations and their actions. The Government will contact this Committee in all matters relating to fedayeen affairs, activity, rights and obligations.
2. Commitments by the Central Committee to the Government will be binding upon all fedayeen organisations and commitments by the Government to the Central Committee will apply to all organisations.
3. The Government will guarantee freedom and protection of fedayeen action and ensure its safety and its right to popular and national mobilisation to the extent to which this does not infringe upon the sovereignty of the State.
4. The courageous Jordanian armed forces, which confront the enemy with determination, and follow the path of sacrifice and honour in order to recover the usurped homeland, are a basic pillar among Arab military forces. The common struggle holds them and the Resistance Forces together in the battle of steadfastness and liberation.
5. Palestinian resistance is a national fighting force and is one of the basic requirements of our fight against aggression and for liberation. For this reason it should be supported and escalated.

In furtherance of the above principles and bases, the Government will take the following measures:-

1. The Government will cancel all emergency steps and measures taken during the crisis.
2. Support for the armed struggle in the fight for liberation and the wresting back of rights from the usurping enemy and taking all measures to ensure solidarity between the Jordanian armed forces and the armed struggle of the forces of the Palestine Revolution by word and deed along the pathway to liberation.
3. Mobilisation of the information media and of morale in order to serve the Palestine revolution's aim of liberation and to serve the people and the armed forces.
4. The Government will undertake that no apparatus or organisation or element will be set up or act against the interests of the Palestine revolution or national unity.

The Central Committee will adhere to the following organisational principles and measures, which have already been published:-

- (a) A ban on military demonstrations and on the presence of armed fedayeen in public places (cafés, hotels, cinemas, restaurants, parks, government departments and law courts), with the exception of special guards on offices and leaders.

- (b) All resistance vehicles must carry special-number plates and must stop at road-blocks if required to do so. In the event of any dispute at a road-block, the responsible member of the armed struggle military police, in cooperation with the officer in charge of the road-block will deal with the situation.
- (c) Since the army, security forces and the fedayeen belong to the same people and are brothers-in-arms, all must be careful not to encroach on the dignity of one another. They must sanctify the spirit of unity and cordiality between them.
- (d) Shooting, manoeuvres and training with live ammunition within towns and populated areas are strictly forbidden.
- (e) Military bases of the fedayeen organisations, with the exception of the bases of their popular resistance forces, are prohibited in towns. The storing of explosives, ammunition and heavy arms in populated places is forbidden. The bases are to be defined by a joint committee of the General Staff and the military command of the armed struggle.
- (f) All fedayeen undertake to observe the regulations in force and any member of the fedayeen organisations committing a crime or civil offence against the laws and regulations in force in the Kingdom will be handed over to the competent Jordanian authorities.
- (g) No soldier serving in the army will be accepted into the ranks of the fedayeen organisations.

It was agreed to form a joint committee for following-up action, to receive reports on contraventions and to deal with new developments within the framework of national unity and the highest national interests.

It was agreed that the joint committee of inquiry should continue its work of determining responsibility for all the recent deplorable events.

The Joint Committee to follow up the agreement
between the Jordanian Government and the Central
Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organisation

Government Representatives

Akif al-Fayiz (Minister of State for Prime Ministerial
Affairs)

Abdul Wahal al-Majali (Minister of State for Prime
Ministerial Affairs & Minister of
Defence)

Suleiman al-Hadidi (Minister of the Interior)

Major General Mashhour Haditha (Chief of Staff of
the Jordanian Armed Forces)

Major General Zuhair Matar (Director General of
Public Security)

Fedayeen Representatives

Dhafi Jum'ani (Sa'iqua)

George Habbash (P.F.L.P.)

Nayef Hawatmeh (P.D.F.L.F.)

Abu Ayyad (Salah Khalaf - Fatah)

Kamal Nasser (P.L.O. Spokesman)

Brigadier Abdul Razzaq al Yahya (P.L.A.)

Near Eastern Department,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London S.W.1

Mr. MacKee ^{from}
Mr. Long
28/7
(L.O.)

23 July, 1970.

R.E. 28/7

This is a very useful and illuminating document on the subject. We now have a clear picture of the agreement amounts to. It is very likely to turn out, than we were able to deduce from reading the text alone.

2. I have not then as I ought to have done to thank you for the information you have sent me about developments in the region. The reason, quite simply, is that there is a great deal in the Department that we can seldom find in letters which do not positively call for it. I hope that you will not think us remiss; that your admirable reports are not much appreciated.

(R. H. Evans)

C. D. Lush, Esq.,
Amman.

NE Regy.

please

- (i) make & send to me
2 copies of this
20 (x all its enclosures)
(ii) p.a.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(22)


Reg P/w and

bring up to Mr. Evans

on 18/8.

ACOSM

10/8



(i) M. Evans

(ii) P. A.

17/8

R.E. 18/8.

1/1

BRITISH EMBASSY,

ATHENS.

6 August, 1970

NEJ 1/8.

Dear Richard,

Many thanks for your kind letter NEJ 1/8 of 28 July. I only hope that our commentary on the 10 July agreement will not turn out to have been a piece of wasted ingenuity.

2. Having been through something of the sort myself I do realise the appalling pressures you are under in London. I assure you that we do not feel neglected out here.

Yours ever,

C Dristofur

(C. D. Lush)

P.S. If you ever need material on a specific topic quickly, please let us know, and we shall (DWS permitting) supply it.

R. Evans, Esq.,
Near Eastern Dept.,
F.O.O.

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER CAT A
IMMEDIATE JEDDA
TELNO 563

RECEIVED IN

23

CONFIDENTIAL 233645Z

NCJ 1/8

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN
563 OF 23/9. REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO IMMEDIATE CAIRO
UKHIS NEW YORK PRIORITY TO AMMAN, TEL AVIV AND WASHINGTON
AND SAVING TO PARIS, MOSCOW, KHARTOUM AND TRIPOLI.
BY TELEGRAM NO. 559 (NOT TO ALL): CAIRO CONFERENCE ON JORDAN.
I HAVE BEEN INFORMED BY THE COMPTROLLER OF THE PALACES THAT
THE KING IS LEAVING FOR CAIRO AT 13 O'CLOCK LOCAL TIME THIS
MORNING.

2. LATE LAST NIGHT KAMAL ADHAM SAID THAT THE KING HAD NOT MADE
ANY DECISION TO LEAVE. THE POSITION WAS THAT IN REPLY (COPIED TO
PRESIDENT BARDESS) TO A MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT SCOROMIA ON 21
SEPTEMBER FAISAL HAD SAID HE WOULD BE WILLING TO HAVE DISCUSSIONS
WITH HASSEB ON WEDNESDAY (TODAY).

THE MESSAGE FROM CAIRO POSTPONING THE CONFERENCE (BY TELEGRAM
UNDER REFERENCE) PERMITTED THE APPEAL TO FAISAL TO ATTEND. HE HAD
NOT AGREED. ADHAM CLAIMED THAT FAISAL SAID NO POINT IN ATTENDING
A CONFERENCE AT WHICH KING HUSSEIN AND ARASAT WERE NOT PRESENT
AND ADDED THAT NEITHER DID THE KING WANT TO WASTE TIME TALKING TO
THE 'CARBLES AND ALUMINUM'. HOWEVER, THE IMPLICATION IN THE ROYAL

FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH HASSEB. ON THE SITUATION IN JORDAN ADHAM
INTERVIEW. THIS WOULD BE THE WORST THING WHICH COULD HAPPEN.
SAUDI ARABIA DID NOT WANT TO BE SADDENED WITH THE BURDEN OF
SUPPORTING ANOTHER KHARTOUM-LIKE FACADE.

3. PRINCE KHADID RETURNED TO JEDDA LAST NIGHT.
FCO PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATE UKHIS NEWYORK, PRIORITY WASHINGTON
AND SAVING TO PARIS MOSCOW KHARTOUM AND TRIPOLI.

MR. WINCHESTER

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

FCO/WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION
N.E.D.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNN

By P. P. M. M.
23/9

(24)

TYEPHER CAT/A

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD

TO F C O

My 28/6

TELEGRAM NO.657

24 SEPTEMBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL 241411Z

NEJ1/8

ADDRESS TO F C O TELNO.657 DATED 24/9 RFI IMMEDIATE
TO CAIRO , AMMAN , TEL AVIV , URMIS NEW YORK , WASHINGTON.
PRIORITY TO PARIS , MOSCOW , BEIRUT , KHARTOUM , TRIPOLI ,
TUNIS , JEDDA , ALGIERS AND PEKING

CAIRO TELNO. 1054 OF 24 SEPTEMBER : ARAB SUMMIT .

APART FROM THE STATEMENT BY THE ACTING MINISTER OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS ON 21 SEPTEMBER THAT THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT
SAW " NO BENEFIT " IN PARTICIPATING IN THE ARAB SUMMIT
IN CAIRO , THERE HAS BEEN NO FURTHER OFFICIAL PUBLIC IRAQI
REACTION TO THE SUMMIT ITSELF OR TO THE CURRENT MEDIATION
IN JORDAN .

2. HOWEVER , THE GOVERNMENT CONTROLLED NEWSPAPER AL JUMHURIYAH
ON 23 SEPTEMBER GAVE TWO REASONS FOR IRAQ'S REFUSAL TO ATTEND:
(A) THAT THE PALESTINIAN REVOLUTION , REPRESENTED BY THE
CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE P.L.O. CONSIDERED THAT THE CONFERENCE
WAS NO MORE THAN AN ATTEMPT TO PASS RESOLUTIONS AIMED AT
SUPPRESSING THE "REVOLUTION" AND CONDONING THE BARBAROUS
CRIMES COMMITTED BY THE MILITARY REGIME IN JORDAN.
(B) THAT THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE WOULD PUT THE JORDANIAN
MILITARY REGIME ON AN EQUAL FOOTING WITH THE COMMANDOS
WHICH THEY (THE COMMANDOS) TOTALLY REJECT. THE PAPER
POINTED OUT THAT BRIGADIER DAOOD HAD ALREADY BEEN AFFORDED
EQUAL STATUS WITH THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS IN THE SUMMIT
CONFERENCE .

CONFIDENTIAL

/3. THERE HAS

3. THERE HAS NOT, EITHER OFFICIALLY OR IN THE PRESS, BEEN ANY DIRECT ATTACK ON KING HUSSAIN AND AL-THAWRA OF 24 SEPTEMBER, FOR EXAMPLE, MERELY REPEATS THE COMMANDOS CALL FOR THE REMOVAL OF THE REACTIONARY MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN JORDAN AND THE REPLACEMENT OF IT BY A NATIONAL GOVERNMENT.

4. AL-JUMHURIYAH OF 24 SEPTEMBER. IN WHAT IS POSSIBLY A PREPARATION FOR THE FUTURE OFFICIAL LINE ON THE IRAQI ARMY'S ROLE IN THE JORDANIAN FIGHTING, QUOTES THE FATAH REPRESENTATIVE IN BEIRUT AS HAVING SAID "THE IRAQI ARMY IS IN ITS POSITIONS AND IS CARRYING OUT WHAT IT HAS BEEN ASKED TO DO BY THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE."

THE EDITORIAL THEN REFERS TO THE STATEMENT BY A PLO REPRESENTATIVE IN CAIRO ON 22 SEPTEMBER IN WHICH HE DEFINED THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE COMMANDOS AS BEING THE PREVENTION OF US INTERVENTION IN JORDAN.

5. THE ARABIC PRESS HERE HAS GIVEN SOME PROMINENCE TO THE RECENT CHINESE STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF THE PALESTINE COMMANDOS.

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE TO UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON, PRIORITY TO PARIS, KHARTOUM, TUNIS, ALGIERS AND PEKING.

MR. HAWLEY

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

FCO/JH/DISTRIBUTION:

N.E.D.

IMMEDIATE CAIRO

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1059

24 SEPTEMBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL 24/09/70

*new all minis
only to AM**28/1**NEJ 1/8*

ADDRESSED IMMEDIATE TO FCO TEL NO 1059 OF 24 SEPTEMBER 1970
AND RFI IMMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON UKNIS NEW YORK TEL AVIV AMMAN
PRIORITY TO PARIS MOSCOW BEIRUT BACHDAD JEDDA KUWAIT TRIPOLI
KHARTOUM TUNIS AND ALGIERS.

MY TELEGRAM NO 1054 : ARAB SUMMIT.

IT IS AGAIN DIFFICULT TO DISCOVER EXACTLY WHAT HAPPENED AT THE
SUMMIT YESTERDAY. KING FAISAL AND THE RULER OF KUWAIT ARRIVED,
TO BRING THE TOTAL OF ARAB LEADERS IN CAIRO TO TEN, WHILE PRESIDENT
ATASSI RETURNED TO DAMASCUS.

2. PRESIDENT HUMAIRI AND HIS DELEGATION RETURNED TO CAIRO TO
REPORT ON THEIR THREE HOURS OF DISCUSSIONS WITH KING HUSSAIN,
DURING WHICH THE DELEGATION ARE REPORTED BY AHAM TO HAVE PUT FORWARD
THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

- (I) THAT BLOCUSED IN AMMAN MUST BE STOPPED AT ONCE.
- (II) THAT THE WISH OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE MUST BE CLEARLY
UNDERSTOOD, AND THAT THIS REQUIRED THE RELEASE OF THE FOUR MEMBERS
OF THE P.L.O. CENTRAL COMMITTEE IN JORDANIAN HANDS: THE NEED FOR
THE DELEGATION TO CONTACT ARAFAT: AND THE IMPORTANCE OF ARRANGING
A MEETING OF THE LARGEST NUMBER OF MEMBERS OF THE P.L.O.
CENTRAL COMMITTEE TO GIVE THEM AN OPPORTUNITY TO " APPRECIATE
THE SITUATION JOINTLY IN AN OPEN ATMOSPHERE."
- (III) IT WAS IN THE INTERESTS OF ALL PARTIES THAT A
GOVERNMENT OF ANOTHER TENDENCY SHOULD EXIST IN JORDAN, BUT THIS
QUESTION WAS EXCLUSIVELY WITHIN THE COMPETENCE OF THE KING
SINCE HE ALONE SHOULD BE THE FIRST TO REALISE THAT A CHANGE
WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT IS NEEDED :
- (IV) THE NEED TO ARRANGE FOR ARMED FORCES TO BE REMOVED FROM
AMMAN. THE KING HAD ALLUDED TO THIS IN A LETTER YESTERDAY IN
WHICH HE SAID THAT THIS WAS HIS VIEW ALSO WITH RESPECT TO BOTH
THE PALESTINIANS AND THE JORDANIAN ARMY.

CONFIDENTIAL

/3.

3. THE RELEASE OF THE FOUR PALESTINIANS, WHO ARRIVED IN CAIRO WITH HUMAIRI, LED TO CONSIDERABLE CONFUSION HERE ABOUT WHO WAS REALLY SPEAKING FOR THE PALESTINIANS. ABU AYAD WAS CLAIMING HERE THAT THE PALESTINIANS HAD ACCEPTED THE CEASEFIRE WHILE ARAFAT (WHOM THE DELEGATION FAILED TO CONTACT) IS REPORTED TO HAVE REJECTED IT. NEVERTHELESS, THE PRESS CONFERENCE GIVEN LAST NIGHT BY THE P.L.O. IN CAIRO (WHICH AGAIN WAS NOT REPORTED IN THE PRESS) MAINTAINED AN EXTREMELY HARD LINE AND REPEATED THE EARLIER CALL FOR THE LIQUIDATION OF THE JORDANIAN THRONE (PARAGRAPH 2 OF MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE). MEANWHILE , THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT DELEGATION IS REPORTED TO HAVE HAD NO CONTACT WHATSOEVER WITH ANY OF THOSE PRESENT AT THE SUMMIT, AND TO HAVE BEEN CONFINED TO THEIR HOTEL ALL DAY. WE NOTED ON THE PREVIOUS DAY THAT THE JORDANIAN PRIME MINISTER WAS RECEIVED ONLY BY THE MINISTER OF IRRIGATION AT CAIRO AIRPORT. ATASSI'S DEPARTURE ACCOMPANIED BY A MEMBER OF THE LIBYAN R.C.C. WAS NOT SPECIFICALLY REPORTED IN MOST PAPERS (AND REFERENCES TO HIS DEPARTURE IN PRESS CABLES WERE CENSORED). WE HAVE NO INFORMATION YET ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF HIS DEPARTURE, BUT IT SEEMS AT LEAST LIKELY THAT THIS AROSE FROM DISAGREEMENTS ARISING FROM ALLEGATIONS OF SYRIAN INTERVENTION. TODAY'S PRESS REPORTS THAT THE ALGERIAN MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS HAS SUMMONED THE AMBASSADORS OF IRAQ AND SYRIA TO DISCUSS CO-ORDINATION BETWEEN THE THREE STATES AND A LEADING MEMBER OF THE SYRIAN DA'ATH IS REPORTED TO HAVE ARRIVED IN ALGIERS YESTERDAY CARRYING A MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT ATASSI.

4. ONE OF THE FEW CONCRETE DECISIONS TAKEN BY THE SUMMIT YESTERDAY WAS THE FORMATION OF A RELIEF COMMITTEE UNDER KING FAISAL'S CHAIRMANSHIP TO CO -ORDINATE ARAB RELIEF OPERATIONS IN JORDAN.

5. IT SEEMS POSSIBLE THAT THE GREATER REDINESS OF THE KING TO ACCEPT A CEASEFIRE AND THE DIFFICULTIES OF ACHIEVING A CO-ORDINATED RESPONSE FROM THE PALESTINIANS MAY INDUCE SLIGHTLY MORE SYMPATHY FOR HUSSAIN'S POSITION AMONG THE ASSEMBLED ARAB

CONFIDENTIAL

CAIRO TELEGRAM NO.1059 TO FCO.

-3-

LEADERS IN CAIRO. THIS IS CERTAINLY THE IMPRESSION GIVEN BY TODAY'S PRESS, ALTHOUGH THE PRESENCE OF KING FAISAL MAY HAVE DONE SOMETHING TO BRING ABOUT THIS CHANGE. I WOULD NOT, HOWEVER EXPECT THIS SIGNIFICANTLY TO ALTER THE GENERAL TENDENCY WHICH WILL NO DOUBT CONTINUE TO DEMAND MOST OF THE CONCESSIONS FROM KING HUSSAIN. TODAY'S EDITORIAL IN AHRAM SAYS THAT IT IS NOT ENOUGH FOR THE JORDANIAN AUTHORITIES TO SHOW WILLINGNESS TO RESPOND TO THE WISHES OF THE SUMMIT MEETING: THE VITAL QUESTION IS WHETHER THEY HAVE THE CAPACITY TO IMPLEMENT THE CEASEFIRE. OUR OFFICIAL CONTACTS HERE TEND TO BLAME KING HUSSAIN FOR THE LARGE NUMBER OF CASUALTIES ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT WAS INADMISSIBLE AND INHUMANE TO USE TANK FIRE AND ARTILLERY IN BUILT-UP AREAS AND AGAINST A LIGHTLY ARMED OPPOSITION. GENERALLY THEREFORE PUBLIC SYMPATHY TOWARDS HUSSAIN HAS EBBED. WE HAVE SOME INDICATION THAT THIS APPLIES EVEN TO THE TUNISIANS.

FCO PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK
PRIORITY PARIS KHARTOUM TUNIS AND ALGIERS

SIR R.BEAUMONT

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

FCO/WH DISTRIBUTION

H.E.D.

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE CAIRO TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1061 25 SEPTEMBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL
250820Z

ADDS TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO. 1061 DATED 25/9/70 REPEATED
FOR INFO (IMMEDIATE) TO WASHINGTON, UKHIS NEW YORK, *NEJ 1/8*
TEL AVIV AND AMMAN (PRIORITY) TO BEIRUT, PARIS, MOSCOW,
BAGHDAD, JEDDA, KUWAIT, TRIPOLI, KHARTOUM, TUNIS AND ALGIERS.

MY TELEGRAM NO. 1059 :

ARAB SUMMIT

MM

THE THIRD DAY OF THE SUMMIT SAW THE DEPARTURE OF TWO
DELEGATIONS, ONE UNDER NUMAIRI TO AMMAN, AND THE SECOND,
CONSISTING OF THREE LEADING PALESTINIANS, TO DAMASCUS.
THE EVENING BROUGHT NEWS OF THE RESIGNATION AND TEMPORARY
DISAPPEARANCE OF THE JORDANIAN PRIME MINISTER .

2. NUMAIRI'S DELEGATION, WHICH THIS TIME HAS ADDED TO
IT HUSAIN SHAFEI (A SENIOR MEMBER OF THE ARAB SOCIALIST UNION),
DR. RASHAD PHARAOUN OF SAUDI ARABIA, THE SUDANESE FOREIGN
MINISTER , AND ACCORDING TO ONE REPORT IBRAHIM BAKR OF THE
PLO CENTRAL COMMITTEE, IS AGAIN TRYING TO MAKE CONTACT
WITH ARAFAT, IN THE HOPE OF OBTAINING AN EFFECTIVE CEASEFIRE.
THE REMAINING HEADS OF STATE (WHO HAVE NOW BEEN JOINED BY
THE NEW LEBANESE PRESIDENT) REMAIN IN CAIRO ENGAGING IN
VARIOUS COMBINATIONS OF BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL MEETING.

3. GENERAL DAUD'S LETTER OF RESIGNATION, WHICH IS NO
DOUBT AVAILABLE TO YOU FROM NEWS AGENCY REPORTS, IS PUBLISHED
IN FULL IN TODAY'S PRESS, AND IS SEEN HERE AS AN ATTEMPT
TO ENABLE KING HUSSEIN TO RESPOND TO THE UNANIMOUS WISH
OF THE HEADS OF STATE TO SEE A NEW, CONCILIATORY, CIVILIAN
GOVERNMENT FORMED IN AMMAN.

/4.PRESS.

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

4. PRESS COMMENT CONTINUES TO INSIST ON THE NEED TO SAFEGUARD THE PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE. SEVERAL PAPERS COMMENT THAT THE AMERICANS HAVE NOT CONCEALED THEIR HOPE THAT KING HUSSEIN WILL SUCCEED IN HIS CONFRONTATION WITH THE RESISTANCE, "ONE OF THE NOBLEST PHENOMENA PRODUCED BY THE CONFRONTATION WITH ISRAEL" (AL AHRAH).

FCO PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON AND UKNIS NEW YORK AND PRIORITY TO PARIS, KHARTOUM, TUNIS AND ALGIERS.

SIR R. BEAUMONT

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

FCO/WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION
NEAR EASTERN DEPT

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE CAIRO TO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1067

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
26 SEPTEMBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

11.345Z

DES 1/8

ADDED TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO. 1067 DATED 26/9/70 REPEATED FOR INFO
(IMMEDIATE) TO WASHINGTON, WILKS NEW YORK, TEL AVIV
AND AMMAN (PRIORITY) TO BEIRUT, PARIS, MOSCOW, CASABLANCA, JEDDAH,
KUWAIT, TRIPOLI, KHARTOUM, TUNIS AND ALGIERS.

MY TELEGRAM NO, 1061 : ARAB SUMMIT.

PRESIDENT NIMEIRI RETURNED FROM AMMAN WITH HIS DELEGATION
LATE LAST NIGHT AFTER ACHIEVING AGREEMENT ON A CEASE-FIRE,
IT IS LATER REPORTED TO HAVE BROKEN DOWN. THE UAR PRESS
REPORTS AND EDITORIALS ARE UNANIMOUS IN ATTRIBUTING
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE BREAKDOWN TO THE JORDANIAN ARMY.

2. THE REMAINING HEADS OF DELEGATIONS HAD MET AT 7.20 PM
YESTERDAY TO CONSIDER A TELEGRAPHIC REPORT RECEIVED FROM
NIMEIRI ON THE PROGRESS OF HIS MISSION IN AMMAN. AFTER A
FURTHER REPORT HAD BEEN RECEIVED FROM HIM ACCUSING THE JORDANIAN
ARMY OF PERSISTENT FIRING, IT WAS DECIDED TO ADJOURN THE
MEETING UNTIL MIDNIGHT. IN FACT, THE MEETING APPEARS TO
HAVE RESUMED SHORTLY AFTER 11.00 PM WHEN IT WAS JOINED BOTH
BY NIMEIRI AND ARAFAT, WHO HAD BEEN SECRETLY WHICKED OUT OF
JORDAN.

3. NIMEIRI IS GIVING A PRESS CONFERENCE THIS MORNING
AT WHICH HE IS TO GIVE A FULL REPORT OF HIS MISSION. ACCORDING
TO THE PRESS, HE HAD MET ARAFAT EARLY YESTERDAY IN THE UAR
EMBASSY IN AMMAN AND ARAFAT HAD GIVEN HIS ESTIMATE OF 25,000
DEAD AND WOUNDED IN THE FIGHTING. IN AN ATTEMPT TO STOP
THE FIGHTING NIMEIRI IS SAID TO HAVE REACHED AGREEMENT ON THE
FORMATION OF AN OBSERVATION TEAM UNDER AN EGYPTIAN BRIGADIER
WITH FIVE EGYPTIAN OFFICERS AND TWO OFFICERS EACH FROM SUDAN,
TUNISIA AND KUWAIT.

CONFIDENTIAL

/4. THE

4. THE GENERALLY CRITICAL TONE OF THE PRESS TOWARDS KING HUSSEIN AND THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT IS HEIGHTENED BY REPORTS OF THE LIBYAN GOVERNMENT'S RUPTURE OF RELATIONS WITH AMMAN AND BY THE PUBLICATION OF A STRONGLY WORDED MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT NASSER (TEXT IN M.I.P.T.).

5. SEE ALSO M.I.F.T.

FCO PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON AND UNITS NEW YORK PRIORITY TO PARIS, KHARTOUM, TUNIS AND ALGIERS.

SIR R. BEAUMONT

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

FCO/WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION
NEAR EASTERN DEPT

CONFIDENTIAL

TOP SECRET

28

CYTHR/CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE CATDO

TO

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1072

26 SEPTEMBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

261254Z

ADDED TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO. 1072 DATED 26/9/70 REPEATED
FOR INFO (IMMEDIATE) TO WASHINGTON, UKNIS NEW YORK AND
TEL AVIV (PRIORITY) TO BEIRUT, PARIS, MOSCOW, BAGHDAD, JEDDA,
KUWAIT, TRIPOLI, KHARTOUM, TUNIS AND ALGIERS.

NEJ 1/8

29/8

MY TELEGRAM NO. 1066 PARAGRAPH 3 : ARAB SUMMIT.

ACCOUNTS OF NINEIRI'S PRESS CONFERENCE WILL NO DOUBT BE
AVAILABLE TO YOU FROM AGENCY REPORTS, BUT THE TONE OF
NINEIRI'S COMMENTS (WHICH FOLLOWED A LONG ACCOUNT OF EVENTS
IN AMMAN YESTERDAY) WAS INTENSELY CRITICAL OF HUSSEIN, WHOM
HE OPENLY ACCUSED OF FOLLOWING A PREMEDITATED PLAN FOR
LIQUIDATING THE PALESTINIANS. HE ALSO ASSOCIATED BOTH THE
AMERICANS AND THE ISRAELIS WITH THIS.

2. THE ONLY ATTEMPT AT BALANCE IN THE CONFERENCE (FROM
WHICH PHARAON WAS ABSENT BUT AT WHICH THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE
DELEGATION WERE PRESENT) CAME FROM THE TUNISIAN PRIME
MINISTER, WHO EMPHASISED THAT THE DELEGATION'S DUTY HAD BEEN
SOLELY TO REPORT BACK AND COMMENTED THAT THEY HAD NO RIGHT
TO EXPRESS A POINT OF VIEW. THEIR JOB WAS SOLELY TO MEDIATE
AND NEGOTIATION A CEASE-FIRE.

FCO PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON AND UKNIS NEW YORK
(PRIORITY) TO PARIS, KHARTOUM, TUNIS AND ALGIERS.

SIR R. BEAUMONT

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

FCO/WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION
NEAR EASTERN DEPT

CONFIDENTIAL

CLAIR

P. MUM 24/9

29

ROUTINE CAIRO

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1080

28 SEPTEMBER 1970

UNCLASSIFIED 280840Z

ADDRESSED ROUTINE TO FCO TEL NO 1080 OF 28 SEPTEMBER 1970, NE J 1/8
RFI WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK TEL AVIV AMMAN BEIRUT PARIS
MOSCOW BAGHDAD JEDDA KUWAIT TRIPOLI KHARTOUM TUNIS ALGIERS.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF AGREEMENT SIGNED ON 27 SEPTEMBER BY
KING HUSSEIN AND YASIR ARAFAT AND BY THE TEN KINGS AND HEADS OF
STATE ASSEMBLED IN CAIRO.

BEGINS:

IN ORDER TO AVOID THE ARAB BLOODSHED RESULTING FROM
EVENTS IN THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN DURING THE TEN DAYS
PRIOR TO THIS AGREEMENT, AND IN ORDER TO PROTECT THE SECURITY AND
SAFETY OF THE ARAB NATION AGAINST IMPERIALIST THREATS TO WHICH
IT IS EXPOSED, AND IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE STABILITY IN OUR SISTER
STATE OF JORDAN WHO HAS BEEN EXPOSED TO CONFLICT AND AGONIES:

COMPLETE AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED TODAY, 27
SEPTEMBER 1970, BETWEEN THOSE MEETING AT THE CONFERENCE OF
ARAB KINGS AND HEADS OF STATE AS FOLLOWS:

(I) TO END IMMEDIATELY ALL MILITARY OPERATIONS ON THE PART
OF THE JORDANIAN ARMED FORCES AND THE PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE
FORCES AS WELL AS ALL MILITARY MOVEMENTS WHICH ARE NOT NEC-
ESSITATED BY THE DEMANDS OF NORMAL ACTIVITY, AND TO STOP ALL
PROPAGANDA ATTACKS WHICH CONFLICT WITH THE AIMS OF THIS
AGREEMENT.

(II) THE RAPID WITHDRAWAL OF ALL JORDANIAN ARMED FORCES FROM
AMMAN AND THEIR RETURN TO THEIR NATURAL BASES, WITH THE
WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FEDAYIN FORCES FROM AMMAN AND THEIR STATIONING
IN PLACES SUITABLE FOR FEDAYEEN ACTION.

/(III)

(III) AS REGARDS IRRID AND OTHER TOWNS MILITARY AND CIVILIAN
SITUATIONS MUST RETURN TO WHAT THEY WERE BEFORE THE RECENT EVENTS.

(IV) THE INTERNAL SECURITY AUTHORITIES WILL UNDERTAKE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR SECURITY UNDER THE CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATION

(V) THOSE DETAINED ON BOTH SIDES WILL BE RELEASED
IMMEDIATELY.

(VI) THE FORMATION OF A HIGHER COMMITTEE TO FOLLOW UP THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS BASIC AGREEMENT AND ANY SUBSIDIARY
AGREEMENTS WHICH MAY SEEM FROM IT, AND TO UNDERTAKE THE COORDINATION
OF ACTION AND RELATIONS BETWEEN THE JOINT ARAB AUTHORITIES AND
THE PALESTINE RESISTANCE UNTIL SECURITY IS MAINTAINED AND AFFAIRS
RETURN TO NORMAL THIS COMMITTEE HAS THE RIGHT AND
RESPONSIBILITY TO TAKE WHATEVER PRACTICAL MEASURES IT THINKS
FIT TO ACHIEVE A RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE AUTHORITIES CONCERNED
AND THE RESTORATION OF LIFE TO NORMAL.

(VII) THE HIGHER FOLLOW-UP COMMITTEE WILL FORM THREE BRANCH
OFFICES AS FOLLOWS:

(I) A MILITARY OFFICE TO LOOK AFTER ALL MILITARY AFFAIRS
AND TO IMPLEMENT THE POINTS OF THIS AGREEMENT.

(II) A CIVILIAN OFFICE TO LOOK AFTER CIVIL AFFAIRS AND OTHER
NON-MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES.

(III) A RELIEF AND RESCUE OFFICE TO SUPERVISE THE
DISTRIBUTION OF SUPPLIES AND AID OFFERED BY ARAB AND OTHER COUNTRIES
FOR THE VICTIMS, CASUALTIES AND NEEDY.

(VIII) THE COMMITTEE WILL PREPARE AND CONCLUDE AN AGREEMENT
BINDING ON BOTH SIDES TO ENSURE THE CONTINUATION OF THE FEDAYIN
AND THE RESPECT OF THE NATION'S SOVEREIGNTY WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF
LAW WITH EXCEPTIONS NECESSARY FOR FEDAYIN ACTION.

(IX) THE RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE HIGHER FOLLOW - UP
COMMITTEE IN IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS AGREEMENT WILL BE FINALLY
AND TOTALLY BINDING ON BOTH PARTIES.

(X) THE COMMITTEE WILL UNDERTAKE THIS RESPONSIBILITY AT ONCE
IT WILL SUBMIT REPORTS TO THE ARAB KINGS AND HEADS OF STATE
FROM TIME TO TIME ON ITS ACTIVITIES AND ON THE DECISIONS IT
TAKES AND ON THE PROGRESS TO WHICH THIS AGREEMENT IS BEING IMPLEMENTED
AND OBSERVED BY THE PARTIES CONCERNED.

(XI) THE COMMITTEE WILL BE UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF MR. AL BAH LADGHAN, PRIME MINISTER OF TUNISIA, AND WILL CONSIST OF TWO OTHER MEMBERS, ONE OF THEM REPRESENTING THE JORDANIAN AUTHORITIES AND APPOINTED BY HIS MAJESTY KING HUSSEIN, THE SECOND REPRESENTING THE PALESTINE REVOLUTION APPOINTED BY MR. YASIR ARAFAT. THE COMMITTEE MAY ENLIST THE HELP OF THOSE IT CONSIDERS NECESSARY.

(XII) TO CREATE A FAVOURABLE ATMOSPHERE FOR APPLYING THIS AGREEMENT AND TO MAKE THE REALISATION OF ITS NOBLE OBJECTIVES POSSIBLE AND LEGITIMATE, BOTH SIDES ARE REQUIRED TO STOP ALL STATES OF EXCEPTIONAL AND MILITARY RULE.

(XIII) IN THE EVENT OF EITHER OF THE TWO SIDES (JORDANIAN OR PALESTINE RESISTANCE) VIOLATING ANY OF THE CLAUSES OF THIS AGREEMENT OR IMPEDING ITS IMPLEMENTATION. ALL THE ARAB COUNTRIES SIGNATORY TO THE AGREEMENT WILL TAKE UNIFIED AND UNANIMOUS MEASURES AGAINST THAT PARTY.

(XIV) THERE IS TO BE SUPPORT AND SOLIDARITY FOR THE PALESTINE REVOLUTION UNTIL ITS AIMS OF TOTAL LIBERATION AND THE ROUTING OF THE USURPING ISRAELI ENEMY ARE ACHIEVED.

SIGNED BY KING FAISAL, EMIR SABAH AL SALEM AL SABAH, PRESIDENT GAMAL ABDUL NASSER, MR. YASIR ARAFAT, COLONEL MUHAMMAR QADDAFI, GENERAL GAFAAR NIMEIRI, KING HUSSEIN BIN TALAL, MR. AL BAH LADGHAN, PRIME MINISTER OF TUNISIA, PRESIDENT SOLIHAN FRANJIH OF LEBANON, MR. AHMED EL SHANI, MEMBER OF THE YEMENI REPUBLIC COUNCIL.

FCO PLEASE PASS ROUTINE TO WASHINGTON UKNIS NEW YORK AND PARIS.

SIR R. BEAUMONT

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

FCO/WF DISTRIBUTION

N.E.D.

P-0 [initials] 24/11

(5)

STATE CAIRO TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
LEBAN LITHE 1061 23 SEPTEMBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL 281330Z

ANDSO TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO. 1071 DATED 23/9/70 REPEATED
FOR INFO (IMMEDIATE) TO WASHINGTON, LHMIS NEW YORK,
TEL AVIV AND AMMAN (PRIORITY) TO BEIRUT, PARIS, MOSCOW,
SACUDAD, JEDDA, KUWAIT, TRIPOLI, KHARTOUM, TUNIS, ALGIERS.

NY TELEGRAM NO. 1072 : ARAB SUMMIT.

KING HUSSEIN ARRIVED IN CAIRO YESTERDAY MORNING AND WAS MET
BY PRESIDENT NASSER. AFTER SLIGHT HESITATION, KING HUSSEIN
TOOK A STEP FORWARD AND THE TWO LEADERS EMBRACED. THE PRESS
WERE KEPT WELL BACK AND NO PHOTOGRAPHS OF THIS APPEAR
IN THIS MORNING'S PAPERS.

2. AFTER A DAY OF MEETINGS, THE ARAB SUMMIT ENDED
LAST NIGHT WITH AN AGREEMENT, THE TEXT OF WHICH IS IN
M.I.P.T. THE JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR TOLD ME LAST NIGHT THAT
HE WAS PLEASED WITH THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT, AND KING HUSSEIN
CONFIRMED THIS TO ME WHEN I SAW HIM THIS MORNING.

3. AS YOU WILL SEE, IT IS, IN FACT, AN AGREEMENT TO RETURN
TO THE (NEXT THREE WORDS UNDERLINE) STATUS QUO ANTE, INCLUDING
THE DEMILITARISATION OF AMMAN. THE 10TH POINT CALLING FOR
COMPLETE LIBERATION AND THE REMOVAL OF THE "ILLEGITIMATE ISRAELI
ENEMY" WILL NO DOUBT BE READ BY SOME OF THE SIGNATORIES
AS A CALL FOR THE ELIMINATION OF ISRAEL, BUT HAS I SUSPECT
BEEN CAREFULLY DRAFTED AS A COMPROMISE BETWEEN A CALL FOR
TOTAL ELIMINATION OF ISRAEL AND A CALL FOR THE RETURN OF THE
OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

4. THERE IS, I THINK, NO DOUBT THAT KING HUSSEIN'S
DECISION TO JOIN THE SUMMIT WAS BOTH BRAVE AND SKILFUL AND
HAS DONE SOMETHING TO TURN BACK THE RAPID DRIFT OF SYMPATHY
AWAY FROM HIM. HE HAS AT LEAST SHOWN CONSIDERABLE COURAGE
IN FACING HIS ACCUSERS DIRECT.

5. CAIDAFI RETURNED TO LEBYA LAST NIGHT FOR THE CIRCUMSTANCES
 HIS RETURN TO LEBYA. HE WAS SEEN OFF AT CAIRO AIRPORT BY BRIGADIER DAUD WHO IS
 STILL IN CAIRO.

6. THE FACT THAT THIS AGREEMENT WAS REACHED AT ALL IS
 SOMETHING OF A TRIUMPH FOR THE EGYPTIANS WHO MAY WELL HAVE
 BEEN PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE FOR PERSUADING HUSSEIN TO COME
 TO CAIRO. PHOTOGRAPHS IN TODAY'S PRESS SHOW NASSER SITTING
 BETWEEN HUSSEIN AND ARAFAT (WHO, ACCORDING TO ONE REPORT
 STARTED THE MEETINGS WITH REVOLVERS DRAWN UNTIL PERSUADED
 TO REMOVE THEM BY KING FAISAL). APART FROM THE HUMANITARIAN
 WISH TO AVOID CIVIL WAR IN JORDAN AND THE NEED TO ASSERT HIS
 POSITION AS CHIEF CONCILIATOR FOR THE ARABS, NASSER MUST ALSO
 HAVE BEEN CONVINCED TO PREPARE HIMSELF AS AN EFFECTIVE PARTNER
 IN THE JARRING TALKS AND ALL THE SIGNS ARE THAT THE EGYPTIANS
 ARE STILL KEEN TO GET THESE GOING. IT IS I THINK SIGNIFICANT
 THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER SHOULD HAVE SPENT MUCH OF THE TIME
 DURING THE RECENT CRISIS TALKING TO THE SPANIARDS AND ITALIANS
 IN ANTICIPATION OF PRESIDENT NIXON'S VISITS.

7. ACCORDING TO ONE REPORT, NASSER IS SAID TO BE PLEASED
 WITH THE DEGREE TO WHICH EVENTS OF THE PAST TEN DAYS HAVE
 ISOLATED THE SYRIAN, IRAQI AND ALGERIAN FROM THE PALESTINIANS.
 HIS OWN RELATIONS WITH ARAFAT APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN STRENGTHENED,
 THE DECISION TO ALLOW ARAFAT TO REENTER JORDAN FROM CAIRO,
 TAKEN ABOUT FIVE DAYS AGO, SHOWS THAT HE IS CONFIDENT THAT
 HE CAN MAINTAIN REASONABLE CONTROL OVER THE CONTENT OF ITS
 PROGRAMME.

8. KING HUSSEIN WHEN I SAW HIM THIS MORNING WAS, DESPITE
 HIS ORDEALS BOTH IN JORDAN AND HERE, SURPRISINGLY FRESH
 AND IN GOOD FORM. HE REMARKED SOMEWHAT SALLY THAT THERE
 HAD BEEN A GREAT DEAL OF MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE POSITION
 OF THE JORDAN GOVERNMENT AND THE FACTS OF THE SITUATION, BUT
 THAT HE WOULD WORK AS BEST HE COULD FOR RECONCILIATION.
 HIS EQUANIMITY MAY HAVE BEEN ACCOUNTED FOR - POSSIBLY AND THIS
 IS ONLY A GUESS BASED ON HINTS FROM OUTSIDE INFORMANTS - BY
 (A) THE FACT THAT ARAFAT HAS PROBABLY BEEN TOLD BY THE
 ASSEMBLED HEADS OF STATE THAT HE HAS GOT TO DEAL FIRMLY WITH
 THE SPLINTER GROUPS - THE HI-JACKING OF AIRCRAFT IN PARTICULAR
 IS CLEARLY MOST UNPOPULAR, AND
 (B) HIS POSSIBLE SUCCESS IN GETTING THE KUWAITIS (BUT
 ALMOST CERTAINLY NOT THE LEBYANS) TO RESTORE THEIR SUBSIDY.
 I KNOW HE WAS WITH THE AMIR OF KUWAIT LAST NIGHT WHEN I
 TRIED TO REACH HIM.

CAIRO TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TEL. NO. 7087

9. NEVERTHELESS, IT IS DIFFICULT TO BE OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS AGREEMENT, MORE PARTICULARLY SINCE NEITHER OF THE PRINCIPALS (HUSSEIN AND ARAFAT) IS CLEARLY ENTIRELY MASTER IN HIS OWN HOUSE. THEN AGAIN THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT ARE ELASTIC ENOUGH TO ALLOW OF A FLETHORA OF MISUNDERSTANDINGS, GENUINE OR DELIBERATE, AND THE SO CALLED FOLLOW - UP AND POLITICAL AND MILITARY COMMITTEES, ESPECIALLY THE LATTER, WILL NOT, IT SEEMS TO ME, HAVE THE PHYSICAL MEANS TO STOP FIGHTING IF IT WERE TO BREAK OUT AGAIN.

FCO PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON AND UKHIS NEW YORK (PRIORITY) TO PARIS, KHARTOUM, TUNIS AND ALGIERS.

SIR R. BEAUMONT

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

CONFIDENTIAL DISCUSSION

NR. EASTERN D.

BRITISH EMBASSY

(2/8)



CAIRO

7 October 1970

President Nasser's last summitSummary

P5

+1"

NEJ 1/8

The meeting of Arab Heads of State in Cairo from the 22nd to the 27th of September resulted in agreement to end the fighting in Jordan. President Nasser's death inevitably affects conclusions drawn. (Paragraphs 1 - 2)

2. The meeting was the latest of many attempts to resolve the Jordanian dispute. (Paragraphs 3 - 4)

3. After unsuccessful Egyptian attempts to bring about a cease-fire, an Arab summit was proposed by President Bourguiba; Arab Heads of State began to arrive on the 21st amid reports of Syrian intervention. Memories of the Rabat Summit led to a working-group format. (Paragraphs 5 - 8)

4. The next five days imposed great strain on President Nasser. A delegation under General Humeiri was sent to Amman on the 22nd and reported to the Summit throughout the 23rd finally announcing a cease-fire. This was broken, and General Humeiri returned to Amman. The Palestinian delegation returned to Damascus to co-ordinate their policies. (Paragraphs 9 - 12)

5. On the 25th, Colonel Qaddafi severed relations with Jordan and offered asylum to Brigadier Daud who had earlier resigned. That evening's meeting and the press conference on the 26th given by General Humeiri were intensely critical of the Jordanian authorities. (Paragraphs 13 - 14)

6. King Hussein courageously attended the Summit on the 27th, when an agreement was finally signed ending the fighting. (Paragraph 15)

/7.

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

7. The immediate outcome of the meetings was a collective determination to avoid outside intervention, condemnation of the Jordanian Army's behaviour, and a decision to uphold the Hashemite state. King Hussein's freedom of military action was curtailed by the appointment of the Higher Follow-up Committee. Whether or not a real settlement is achieved by the agreement, it was a triumph for the Tunisians and President Nasser, whose successful mediation is some consolation to the Arabs in their loss. (Paragraphs 16 - 17)

8. The last few months have seen fluctuations in U.A.R. relations with the Palestinians and King Hussein. The Cairo agreement may hold Egyptian attitudes towards both in a position of non-committal neutrality. The U.A.R. will continue to pay lip-service to the guerrillas, to try to prevent Ba'athist intervention in Jordan, and to ensure King Hussein's survival. With the durability of the Palestinian entity confirmed the U.A.R. will probably lay increasing stress on the restoration of occupied territories. (Paragraph 18)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

BRITISH EMBASSY

CAIRO

7 October, 1970

12/8)
Sir,

A meeting of Arab leaders was convened in Cairo on the 22nd of September at the suggestion of the Tunisian Government, in an attempt to resolve the most recent outbreak of serious fighting which had occurred in Jordan six days earlier. The meeting resulted in an agreement signed both by King Hussein and by Mr. Yasir Arafat, the Chairman of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (P.L.O.). but it will be remembered chiefly as the last meeting attended by President Nasser before his death.

2. President Nasser's death must inevitably cast some doubt on any conclusions drawn about the outcome of this gathering, and it remains to be seen how far the new leaders of Egypt will alter President Nasser's policies towards King Hussein and the Palestinians. The purpose of this despatch is primarily to record some of the events leading up to the signing of the Cairo agreement on the 28th of September, and to consider briefly how far these events have led to, or reflect, a development in the U.A.R.'s attitude towards both sides.

3. The meeting in Cairo represented the culmination of efforts both in the Arab League and by individual Arab Governments to resolve the continuing dispute between the Jordanian authorities and the Fedayin, which had already resulted in serious intermittent
/fighting

The Right Honourable

Sir Alec Douglas-Home K.T., M.P.,
etc. etc. etc.

Foreign & Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

fighting throughout the summer. The Egyptians themselves had already taken part in two mediation attempts. On the first occasion, Mr. Hassan Sabri el Khuli had taken part, with representatives from Algeria, Sudan and Libya, in the committee of "Four Wise Men" set up on the 22nd of June after King Hussein had returned from a meeting of Arab leaders in Tripoli. On the second occasion, the U.A.R. Ambassador in Amman, Mr. Uthman Huri, joined colleagues from Sudan, Algeria and the Arab League to form a new four-man committee set up after a visit by King Hussein to Alexandria at the end of August and an emergency meeting of the Arab League at the beginning of September. There were also reports that President Nasser had considered early in June sending General Fawzi and Sami Sharaf on a mediation attempt, but had concluded that there were already too many fingers in the pie.

4. In the case of both committees, and in the case of an earlier advisory committee appointed by King Hussein on the 12th of June (consisting of the Jordanian Chief of Staff, Mr. Arafat, Vice-President Amrash of Iraq and the Algerian Foreign Minister (Mr. Boutefliqa)) these efforts failed to resolve the basic problems and in each case fighting broke out after a short respite. On the last occasion, it was clear that any four-man committee could have little influence on a rapidly deteriorating situation, in which an attempt was made on King Hussein's life, although agreement was reached on a cease-fire on the 10th of September. After the announcement of a military government in Jordan, however, six

/days

-3-

days later serious fighting broke out in Amman on the 17th of September.

5. On that day, Colonel Qaddafi flew from Libya to meet President Nasser at Marsa Matruh, where he had been ordered by his doctors on the previous day to take a much needed rest. After contacting General Fumeiri in Khartoum, President Nasser and Colonel Qaddafi agreed that the U.N.A. Chief of Staff General Sadiq, should leave at once for Amman in a further attempt to stop the fighting. It was clear that the message which General Sadiq was instructed to convey to Amman (and which was summarised in my telegram No. 1018) had been carefully drafted to avoid committing any of the three leaders too deeply to one side or the other, although even at this stage more emphasis was given to the rights of the Palestinians than to those of the Jordanian Government.

6. By the 19th of September, there were still no signs of an effective cease-fire and President Nasser sent further messages both to King Hussein and to Mr. Arafat calling urgently for a cease-fire, even for 24 hours. Meanwhile, the Tunisian Prime Minister, Mr. Bahi Ladgham, had contacted Vice President Anwar Sadat to convey a message from President Bourguiba proposing an Arab summit conference, to be held as soon as possible in Cairo to consider the situation in Jordan in the presence of both King Hussein and Arafat. The proposal was said to have been accepted already by Colonel Qaddafi, King Hussein and President Boumedienne of Algeria, though the latter and King Hassan of Morocco later decided not to participate.

/7.

-4-

7. Two days later, Arab Heads of State began to arrive in Cairo amid reports of Syrian intervention in Jordan and widespread expectations in the Arab press that either the United States or Israel and possibly Her Majesty's Government also, might decide to intervene in the situation. By the morning of the 22nd of September, President Nasser, General Humeiri, Colonel Gaddafi, President Helu of Lebanon, Shaikh Sabah al Salem al Sabah of Kuwait and President Atassi of Syria were already assembled in Cairo in addition to the Tunisian Prime Minister; President Abdul Rahman al Iriani of Yemen and the Chairman of the South Yemeni Presidential Council, Mr. Salim Lubie Ali, arrived later in the day. All the Foreign Heads of State had been met on arrival by President Nasser himself: the Jordanian delegation, under the new Prime Minister, Brigadier Muhammad Daud, had arrived earlier that morning and had been met by a junior Minister, the Minister of Irrigation. It was subsequently reported in the press that none of the Heads of State had had any contact with the delegation during the day.

8. It was clear that, with memories of the Rabat summit of last December, there was no intention of holding a full Arab summit meeting of the normal type. Apart from other considerations, President Atassi of Syria made it clear that he had no intention of attending such a meeting, and he was probably only persuaded to come to Cairo after assurances that this was to be a different type of gathering. In putting forward their initiative, the Tunisians also probably made a point of insisting that this should be a proper working group, and not merely another exercise in

/competing

-5-

competing for propaganda and public statements of policy.

9. Accounts in the press of what happened over the succeeding five days are confused, although it has been possible to prepare from press reports an approximate calendar of events (at Annex). This not only shows the hectic activity in which all the participants were variously engaged during the meetings in Cairo; it particularly high-lights the very considerable strain which must have been placed on President Nasser himself in his efforts to achieve the agreement which was signed on the evening of the 27th of September. As it turned out, the strain killed him.

10. The first day of the meetings started with a report from General Sadiq who had by now completed four days in Amman. A message was also received from the Chairman of the P.L.O. with an estimate of casualties in the fighting variously reported as 20,000 killed and wounded, 15 000 killed and wounded or 10,000 killed. Although official Jordanian estimates were reported to be a tenth of this, it was nevertheless clear that the fighting had reached horrendous proportions and a decision was quickly taken to send a delegation to Amman under General Humciri, composed of the Tunisian Prime Minister, the ~~Emir of Kuwait~~ and General Sadiq. *Sheikh Sa'ad al Abdullah, Kuwait Minister of Defence and Interior.*

11. On the following day, President Atassi left for Damascus in the company of a member of the Libyan Revolutionary Command Council, Major Lhuweildi Humaidi, and King Faisal of Saudi Arabia arrived for the meetings. Reports were received throughout

/the

-6-

the day from General Numeiri's mission, which by the evening had reported that agreement on a cease-fire had been reached. The mission themselves returned to Cairo late that evening, accompanied by four members of the P.L.O. Central Committee released from their detention by the Jordanian Government. There were still no signs that Tunisian hopes of assembling both King Hussein and Yasir Arafat in Cairo would be achieved, and it was clear that the Palestinian line was becoming increasingly confused, with conflicting statements being issued in Damascus, Cairo and Baghdad. Early in the morning of the 24th of September, a Palestinian delegation left Cairo for Damascus in the hope of unifying Palestinian policies. Meanwhile the Jordanian delegation remained virtually in Coventry at their hotel.

12. On the 24th of September, President Helu of Lebanon was replaced by his successor President Franjich, who had now taken office. Reports had meanwhile been received of a resumption of fighting in Jordan and a further delegation under General Numeiri, who on this occasion was accompanied by the Tunisian Prime Minister, Mr. Husain Shafai of the U.A.R., the Kuwait Minister of Defence, Sh.ikh Rashad Pharon of Saudi Arabia, the Sudanese Foreign Minister and the U.A.R. Chief of Staff, left for Amman, in the hope of contacting both King Hussein and Arafat (whom General Numeiri had so far been unable to meet).

13. On the 25th of September, while the situation in Amman was still uncertain and while most of the delegations no doubt still hoped to avoid too firm a commitment to one side or the other, Colonel Qaddafi took the characteristically precipitate move

/of

-7-

of severing relations with the Jordanian Government, from whom the Libyans had already withdrawn their Khartoum aid. It was also announced that Colonel Qaddafi had offered political asylum to Brigadier Daud, who in a dramatic move had disappeared from his hotel on the previous day leaving behind a note of resignation. Late on that evening, the delegation under General Numeiri returned from Amman bringing Yasir Arafat with them. Heads of State were already in session at the Hilton Hotel when they were joined by Arafat shortly after 11.00 p.m. The meeting continued for more than three hours, and (to judge from the message subsequently sent by President Nasser to King Hussein) was intensely critical of the Jordanian authorities and increasingly sympathetic to the plight of the Palestinians.

14. On the following morning the 26th of September, General Numeiri and most other members of his delegation appeared at a press conference in which they each described their experiences and views of the situation in Jordan. These were universally critical of the King and the tone of the press in Cairo became increasingly bitter about what General Numeiri openly described as premeditated genocide. The impression given by Mr. Pharaon's absence was that the Saudis agreed the findings but were not prepared to do so publicly.

15. It was against this background that King Hussein, with considerable courage and wisdom, decided to attend the meeting himself. On the morning of the 27th of September he arrived at Cairo airport and was met by President Nasser. The press were kept well back, and no photographs of his reception appeared on the following day, but we were told that after a slight hesitation King Hussein took the initiative of coming forward and the two

/leaders

-8-

leaders, whose relationship had suffered worse strains than this in the past few years. embraced. A full day of meetings followed, on which we still have little reliable information. It is said that both King Hussein and Arafat flanked President Nasser at the meetings with revolvers on the table before them, until persuaded by King Faisal to put them away. It is also reliably reported that Colonel Qaddafi refused to shake hands with King Hussein and it is probably significant that Qaddafi was the first to leave Cairo that evening. Nevertheless, agreement was finally reached later that day and the press were invited at 8.45 p.m. to witness the signing of an agreement the text of which was reported in my telegram No. 1080.

16. The immediate outcome of these meetings seems to have been in short:

(i) Whatever the individual views of the participants the collective view to which they felt obliged to subscribe was that foreign intervention in Jordan and U.S. intervention in particular was to be avoided at all costs.

(ii) Hence there was strong disapproval of Syrian intervention and President Atassi is said to have returned to Syria in dudgeon.

(iii) The assembled Heads of State were very impressed with the reports of the U.A.R. Chief of Staff, General Numeiri and, in particular, of the Tunisian Prime Minister that the Jordan Army was behaving with quite unnecessary and, in any case, quite unacceptable brutality - perhaps according to a pre-arranged plan to intimidate if not annihilate as many Palestinians as possible.

/ (iv)

-9-

(iv) They accordingly gave King Hussein a very cold reception (to which Nasser, as host, was the exception) and they were not convinced by his explanations.

(v) Nevertheless - and with the agreement of Arafat - they determined that the Hashemite state should be upheld, but that King Hussein's freedom of military action as well as that of the Fedayin should be curtailed by the appointment of the Higher Follow-up Committee, with its three subsidiaries: the military committee to supervise the cease-fire; the civilian (political) committee for non-military affairs arising between the two parties; and, the relief committee to supervise the distribution of medical aid and supplies from the Arab countries. The last-named committee subsumed the Relief Committee earlier set up under King Faisal.

17. At the time of writing, it is impossible to say, nor indeed is it for me to judge, how far the agreement can bring about a real settlement of the situation in Jordan. It is, however, something of a triumph that the Tunisians, who were until recently regarded in Cairo as one of the pariahs of the Arab world, should have proposed and carried through this initiative and Egyptian participants spoke in terms of high praise of the calm and constructive part played by Mr. Ladgham. But it was ultimately a triumph of President Nasser's personal weight and diplomacy that the meeting concluded in any agreement at all. It must be some consolation to the Egyptian people and to the Arabs in general that President Nasser should have died in the immediate aftermath of a successful attempt to bring conciliation to Jordan.

/18.

-10-

18. There is no space in this despatch to deal fully with the developments which the last few months have brought about in Egyptian relations both with the Palestinians and with King Hussein. It is enough to point out that, since Mr. Stewart wrote his despatch of the 10th of July on U.A.R. relations with the Palestinians, broadcasting facilities allotted to Fatah in Cairo had been closed down on the 28th of July, numbers of Palestinian students (and probably many more than the 140 admitted by the local press) had been expelled from the U.A.R. and the Palestinian Liberation Army (such as it was) had almost certainly been removed from the Canal. Subsequent hi-jacking incidents including the destruction of a Boeing 747 at Cairo airport on the 7th of September, had strained relations between the Egyptians and the Palestinians even further. This is worth recalling at this point, since it high-lights the subsequent sharp deterioration in relations between the Egyptian and Jordanian Governments following the incidents in Jordan in mid-September. The Cairo agreement of the 27th of September may have succeeded in holding Egyptian attitudes to both the Palestinians and the Jordanians in a position of comparatively non-committal neutrality. I have no doubt that in future the U.A.R. Government will continue to pay lip service to the Palestinian guerillas and that their policy will remain based on the principle which Nasser was so fond of quoting: "The settlement of the Arab-Israel problem depends on the restoration of the occupied territories and the satisfaction of the rights of the Palestinian people: - the land and the people". In pursuit of this policy

/I

- 11 -

19. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives in Washington, United Kingdom Mission, New York, Paris, Moscow, Amman, Tel Aviv, Baghdad, Kuwait, Aden, Jeddah, Khartoum, Tripoli, Tunis, Algiers and Rabat.

Sir

Your Obedient ~~Servant~~

1011
J. J. J.

CONFIDENTIAL

Calendar of Events

(As Reported in the U.A.R. Press)

22 September

c. 09.00 Jordanian delegation under Brigadier Daud arrives.

10.45 President Nasser meets Ruler of Kuwait.

11.00 Meeting In Kubba Palace: President Nasser, General Numeiri, Col. Qaddafi, President Helu, Ruler of Kuwait, Prime Minister Ladgham of Tunisia. Also present were Vice-President Anwar Sadat, Mr. Hussain al Shafei, Mr. Ali Sabri, General Muhammad Sadiq.

11.50 President Nasser leaves meeting to contact King Hussein by telephone.

12.20 -
12.40 General Numeiri contacts King Hussein.

12.30 -
14.00 Heads of State go to Aruba Palace to meet President Atassi of Syria, returning for lunch at Kubba Palace.

16.00 -
16.30 Meeting between Presidents Nasser, Qaddafi and Atassi.

Later General Numeiri, Mr. Ladgham, Sheikh Sabah and General Sadiq leave for Amman, seen off by President Nasser, who also meets Qadi Abdul Rahman al Iriani of Yemen and Chairman Salim Rabie Ali of South Yemen on arrival. President Atassi calls on Mr. Rabie.

21.00 Dinner given by Col. Qaddafi followed by meetings until early morning at Kubba Palace.

23 September

a.m. President Atassi leaves for Damascus, accompanied by Major Khuweildi Humaidi of Libyan Revolutionary Command Council. Col. Qaddafi meets Mr. Rabie.

11.00 Meetings resume. President Nasser leaves to meet King Faisal of Saudi Arabia at the Airport.

12.30 -
14.00 President Nasser and King Faisal join the meeting, which considers General Numeiri's report on his three hour meeting with King Hussein, and agrees to set up a Relief Committee under King Faisal.

14.00 Vice-President Anwar Sadat escorts King Faisal to Hilton Hotel.

23 September (cont.)

- 20.00 Meetings resume at Hilton Hotel.
- 20.50 President Nasser and Colonel Qaddafi meet returning delegation, accompanied by Faruq Qaddumi (Abu Lutf), Saleh Khalaf (Abu Ayyad), Nahjat Abu Gharbia and Ibrahim Bakr of P.L.O. Central Committee.
- 22.15 Meetings resume at Hilton, joined by Presidents Nasser, Qaddafi, Numeiri and the delegation until 1.00 a.m. to listen to General Numeiri's report.

24 September

- 02.00 Palestinian Delegation (Abu Lutf and Nahjat Abu Gharbia) leaves for Damascus.
- c.06.00 President Iriani returns to Sanaa (thereafter represented by Ahmad al Shami).
- 10.30 President Franjieh of Lebanon arrives to take President Helu's place. Meetings until the afternoon.
- 16.30 President Nasser meets Colonel Qaddafi, and has separate meetings with President Franjieh, King Faisal, General Numeiri, Ruler of Kuwait and Mr. Ladgham.
- 16.45 Delegation of General Numeiri, Mr. Ladgham, Mr. Shafei, Kuwait Minister of Defence, Sheikh Rashad Pharaon, Sudanese Foreign Minister, General Sadiq and Ibrahim Bakr leaves for Amman.
- p.m. Major Khuweildi Humaidi returns from Damascus
- p.m. Palestinian Delegation returns from Damascus with Zuhair Ilmi and Khalid Qahum.
- 20.30 Meeting at the Hilton Hotel.
- 23.10 General Numeiri appeals to Yassir Arafat on Amman Radio to arrange a meeting with him.

25 September

- 00.45 Arafat replies to General Numeiri's appeal. They meet at the U.A.R. Embassy in Amman "early in the morning".
- a.m. Libyan Ambassador in Cairo announces that Libya has severed relations with Jordan. Ahram also reports that Colonel Qaddafi has offered asylum to Brigadier Daud.
- a.m. Meetings between King Faisal Ruler of Kuwait and Colonel Qaddafi; and between Colonel Qaddafi and Mr. Rabie.

25 September (cont.)

- p.m. President Nasser receives Colonel Qaddafi; they are later joined by Mr. Rabie.
- 19.30 - Meetings to consider report from General Numeiri in
20.30 Amman.
- King Faisal receives Abu Ayyad, Abu Yussuf, Zuhair Ilmi.
- 21.45 General Numeiri's delegation, accompanied by Yassir Arafat, returns to Cairo.
- 22.30 President Nasser and General Numeiri join meeting at Hilton. General Numeiri reports on his visit to Amman.
- 23.05 - Meeting with Arafat at Hilton Hotel.
02.30

26 September

- 11.00 General Numeiri and most of his Delegation hold a Press Conference at the Arab Socialist Union Buildings in Cairo to explain their report criticising King Hussein.
- p.m. Message is received from King Hussein to say that he will arrive in Cairo on 27 September.

27 September

- a.m. President Nasser and Mr. Ladgham meet King Hussein on arrival at Cairo Airport. Arab Truce Supervisory Committee leaves Cairo for Amman.
- 13.15 - First meeting to draft broad lines of agreement.
16.00
- 16.00 - General Numeiri and Mr. Ladgham consider draft in
17.30 Committee.
- 17.30 Discussion between drafting committee and President Nasser, joined by Arafat and Colonel Qaddafi.
- 18.15 - Second meeting to conclude agreement.
20.45
- 20.45 Press invited to witness signature of agreement.
- 22.00 Colonel Qaddafi leaves for Libya. President Nasser sends a message to President Bourguiba, asking him to spare his Prime Minister to head a "Supreme Follow-Up Committee" (to include 10 Libyans).

28 September

09.45 Tunisian Prime Minister, Mr. Ladgham, leaves for Amman as Chairman of the Follow-Up Committee.

10.45 President Franjich leaves for Beirut.

11.15 King Hussein leaves for Amman.

12.15 General Numeiri leaves for Khartoum.

13.45 King Faisal leaves for Geneva.

15.15 Sheikh Sabah al Salem al Sabah leaves for Kuwait. All Five Heads of State were seen off by President Nasser, who was taken ill at the Airport.

18.15 President Nasser dies.

Mr. Evans

has seen

P-111


3/4

President Nasser's Last SummitFly A
...

I attach the entered copy of this dispatch; a copy (with forms LR 20) prepared for printing for General Distribution and "Q" Commonwealth Distribution; a copy with pro-forma for Sir Philip Adams; and a draft letter of thanks. I do not think priority printing is required. N.A.D. have kept a copy.

2. The most important part of the Despatch is in paragraphs 16-18. Sir R. Beaumont believes that U.A.R. policy towards Jordan will continue to aim at ensuring King Hussein's survival. This seems to be everyone's interest (U.S.A., U.S.S.R., ourselves, Israel and even Iraq) except perhaps Syria's. I hope he is right. NAD

Concur.



(C.W. Long)
Near Eastern Department
22 October, 1970

NB

~~NE Reg~~ ~ a. pl. make a copy
of the entered copy & send to
Mr. Harding of NAD.

done
3/11

PLEASE PASS QUICKLY

CONFIDENTIAL

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

Form No. LR 20

DIPLOMATIC REPORT

(NOT TO BE USED FOR TOP SECRET)

Department: ~~NEJ~~ Near Eastern
Security Classification: ~~Conf~~
Nature of Paper (despatch, letter-telegram etc):
From: Cairo
Dated: 7-10-70
FCO file reference: NEJ 118
Title: President Nasser's last summit

(COMPLETE IN DUPLICATE)

1. CIRCULATION (Mark appropriate box):
- | | | |
|------------------------------|-------------------------------------|------------|
| GENERAL | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | 450 copies |
| AFRICA | <input type="checkbox"/> | 100 copies |
| AMERICA and ATLANTIC | <input type="checkbox"/> | 90 copies |
| ASIA and PACIFIC | <input type="checkbox"/> | 100 copies |
| EUROPE | <input type="checkbox"/> | 100 copies |
| NORTH AFRICA and MIDDLE EAST | <input type="checkbox"/> | 95 copies |
| ECONOMIC | <input type="checkbox"/> | 45 copies |

2. COMMONWEALTH CIRCULATION (Despatches from foreign posts only):

"Q" Distribution ~~YES~~ (15 copies)
"A" Distribution ~~YES~~ NO (55 copies)

Signed *[Signature]*
Date 4/11/70

3. Commonwealth Co-ordination Department

For countersignature when applicable
to 2.

Signed R.T. Harfield
Date 4/11/70

4. Library and Records Department (Records Branch) (Room C/ 367)

To register paper as a DR and pass to Printing Section [Registered as D.R. No. 492
Date 5/11/70]

5. Office Services and Supply Department (Printing Section)

To arrange for the printing of 465 copies and pass to
Communications Department (Distribution Section). [Date received 10/11/70
Date cleared 12/11/70]

6. Communications Department (Distribution Section)

- (i) Please extract copies and pass to
Telegram Distribution Room. [Done]
(ii) Please distribute to posts as indicated in
1 above and send copies for Commonwealth Governments
and High Commissioners, if indicated at 2, to Commonwealth
Co-ordination Department.
(iii) If this DR originated in a Commonwealth country please
send one copy to Commonwealth Co-ordination Department

7. Library and Records Department (Records Branch)

Distribution marked in 1 completed copies sent to Commonwealth
Co-ordination Department ... spare copies herewith.
Date 12/11/70 Signed *[Signature]* (Distribution Section)

8. Registry, ~~General~~ Department

This form, together with the attached DR, to be placed on file above original
item, and PA.

The 33 spare copies should be held by you for six months and then destroyed.

Date 11/12/70 Initialled *[Signature]* (Records Branch)

* Delete that which is not applicable.

CONFIDENTIAL

20729-497

CONFIDENTIAL

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

DIPLOMATIC REPORT No. 492/70

NEJ 1/8

General Distribution

UAR

9 October, 1970

PRESIDENT NASSER'S LAST SUMMIT

*The British Ambassador in the UAR to the
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
(Received 9 October)*

SUMMARY

The meeting of Arab Heads of State in Cairo from 22 to 27 September resulted in agreement to end the fighting in Jordan. President Nasser's death inevitably affects conclusions drawn. (Paragraphs 1-2.)

2. The meeting was the latest of many attempts to resolve the Jordanian dispute. (Paragraphs 3-4.)

3. After unsuccessful Egyptian attempts to bring about a cease-fire, an Arab summit was proposed by President Bourguiba; Arab Heads of State began to arrive on 21 September amid reports of Syrian intervention. Memories of the Rabat Summit led to a working-group format. (Paragraphs 5-8.)

4. The next five days imposed great strain on President Nasser. A delegation under General Numeiri was sent to Amman on 22 September and reported to the Summit throughout 23 September finally announcing a cease-fire. This was broken, and General Numeiri returned to Amman. The Palestinian delegation returned to Damascus to co-ordinate their policies. (Paragraphs 9-12.)

5. On 25 September Colonel Qaddafi severed relations with Jordan and offered asylum to Brigadier Daud who had earlier resigned. That evening's meeting and the Press conference on 26 September given by General Numeiri were intensely critical of the Jordanian authorities. (Paragraphs 13-14.)

6. King Hussein courageously attended the Summit on 27 September, when an agreement was finally signed ending the fighting. (Paragraph 15.)

7. The immediate outcome of the meetings was a collective determination to avoid outside intervention, condemnation of the Jordanian Army's behaviour, and a decision to uphold the Hashemite State. King Hussein's freedom of military action was curtailed by the appointment of the Higher Follow-up Committee. Whether or not a real settlement is achieved by the agreement, it was a triumph for the Tunisians and President Nasser, whose successful mediation is some consolation to the Arabs in their loss. (Paragraphs 16-17.)

CONFIDENTIAL

8. The last few months have seen fluctuations in UAR relations with the Palestinians and King Hussein. The Cairo agreement may hold Egyptian attitudes towards both in a position of non-committal neutrality. The UAR will continue to pay lip-service to the guerillas, to try to prevent Ba'athist intervention in Jordan, and to ensure King Hussein's survival. With the durability of the Palestinian entity confirmed the UAR will probably lay increasing stress on the restoration of occupied territories. (Paragraph 18.)

(Confidential)

Sir,

Cairo,

7 October, 1970.

A meeting of Arab leaders was convened in Cairo on 22 September, at the suggestion of the Tunisian Government, in an attempt to resolve the most recent outbreak of serious fighting which had occurred in Jordan six days earlier. The meeting resulted in an agreement signed both by King Hussein and by Mr. Yasir Arafat, the Chairman of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO); but it will be remembered chiefly as the last meeting attended by President Nasser before his death.

2. President Nasser's death must inevitably cast some doubt on any conclusions drawn about the outcome of this gathering, and it remains to be seen how far the new leaders of Egypt will alter President Nasser's policies towards King Hussein and the Palestinians. The purpose of this despatch is primarily to record some of the events leading up to the signing of the Cairo agreement on 28 September, and to consider briefly how far these events have led to, or reflect, a development in the UAR's attitude towards both sides.

3. The meeting in Cairo represented the culmination of efforts both in the Arab League and by individual Arab Governments to resolve the continuing dispute between the Jordanian authorities and the Fedayin, which had already resulted in serious intermittent fighting throughout the summer. The Egyptians themselves had already taken part in two mediation attempts; on the first occasion, Mr. Hassan Sabri el Khuli had taken part, with representatives from Algeria, Sudan and Libya, in the committee of "Four Wise Men" set up on 22 June after King Hussein had returned from a meeting of Arab leaders in Tripoli. On the second occasion, the UAR Ambassador in Amman, Mr. Uthman Nuri, joined colleagues from Sudan, Algeria and the Arab League to form a new four-man committee set up after a visit by King Hussein to Alexandria at the end of August and an emergency meeting of the Arab League at the beginning of September. There were also reports that President Nasser had considered early in June sending General Fawzi and Sami Sharaf on a mediation attempt, but had concluded that there were already too many fingers in the pie.

4. In the case of both committees, and in the case of an earlier advisory committee appointed by King Hussein on 12 June (consisting of the Jordanian Chief of Staff, Mr. Arafat, Vice-President Ammash of Iraq and the Algerian Foreign Minister (Mr. Boutefliqa)) these efforts failed to resolve the basic problems and in each case fighting broke out after a short respite. On the last occasion it was clear that any four-man committee could have little influence on a rapidly deteriorating situation, in which an attempt was made on King Hussein's life, although agreement was reached on a cease-fire on 10 September. After the announcement of a military Government in Jordan, however, six days later, serious fighting broke out in Amman on 17 September.

5. On that day, Colonel Qaddafi flew from Libya to meet President Nasser at Mersa Matruh, where he had been ordered by his doctors on the previous day to take a much needed rest. After contacting General Numeiri in Khartoum, President Nasser and Colonel Qaddafi agreed that the UAR Chief of Staff, General Sadiq, should leave at once for Amman in a further attempt to stop the fighting. It was clear that the message which General Sadiq was instructed to convey to Amman (and which was summarised in my telegram No. 1018) had been carefully drafted to avoid committing any of the three leaders too deeply to one side or the other, although even at this stage more emphasis was given to the rights of the Palestinians than to those of the Jordanian Government.

6. By 19 September, there were still no signs of an effective cease-fire and President Nasser sent further messages both to King Hussein and to Mr. Arafat calling urgently for a cease-fire, even for 24 hours. Meanwhile, the Tunisian Prime Minister, Mr. Bahi Ladgham, had contacted Vice-President Anwar Sadat to convey a message from President Bourguiba proposing an Arab summit conference, to be held as soon as possible in Cairo to consider the situation in Jordan in the presence of both King Hussein and Arafat. The proposal was said to have been accepted already by Colonel Qaddafi, King Hussein and President Boumedienne of Algeria, though the latter and King Hassan of Morocco later decided not to participate.

7. Two days later, Arab Heads of State began to arrive in Cairo amid reports of Syrian intervention in Jordan and widespread expectations in the Arab Press that either the United States or Israel, and possibly Her Majesty's Government also, might decide to intervene in the situation. By the morning of 22 September, President Nasser, General Numeiri, Colonel Qaddafi, President Helu of Lebanon, Shaikh Sabah al Salem al Sabah of Kuwait and President Atassi of Syria were already assembled in Cairo in addition to the Tunisian Prime Minister; President Abdul Rahman al Iriani of Yemen and the Chairman of the South Yemeni Presidential Council, Mr. Salim Rabie Ali, arrived later in the day. All the foreign Heads of State had been met on arrival by President Nasser himself; the Jordanian delegation, under the new Prime Minister, Brigadier Muhammad Daud, had arrived earlier that morning and had been met by a junior Minister, the Minister of Irrigation. It was subsequently reported in the Press that none of the Heads of State had had any contact with the delegation during the day.

8. It was clear that, with memories of the Rabat summit of last December, there was no intention of holding a full Arab summit meeting of the normal type. Apart from other considerations, President Atassi of Syria made it clear that he had no intention of attending such a meeting, and he was probably only persuaded to come to Cairo after assurances that this was to be a different type of gathering. In putting forward their initiative, the Tunisians also probably made a point of insisting that this should be a proper working group, and not merely another exercise in competing for propaganda and public statements of policy.

9. Accounts in the Press of what happened over the succeeding five days are confused, although it has been possible to prepare from Press reports an approximate calendar of events (at Annex). This not only shows the hectic activity in which all the participants were variously engaged during the meetings in Cairo; it particularly highlights the very considerable strain which must have been placed on President Nasser himself in his efforts to achieve the agreement which was signed on the evening of 27 September. As it turned out, the strain killed him.

10. The first day of the meetings started with a report from General Sadiq who had by now completed four days in Amman. A message was also received

from the Chairman of the PLO with an estimate of casualties in the fighting variously reported as 20,000 killed and wounded, 15,000 killed and wounded or 10,000 killed. Although official Jordanian estimates were reported to be a tenth of this, it was nevertheless clear that the fighting had reached horrendous proportions and a decision was quickly taken to send a delegation to Amman under General Numeiri, composed of the Tunisian Prime Minister, Shaikh Sa'ad Al Abdullah, the Kuwaiti Minister of Defence, and General Sadiq.

11. On the following day, President Atassi left for Damascus in the company of a member of the Libyan Revolutionary Command Council, Major Khuweildi Humaidi, and King Faisal of Saudi Arabia arrived for the meetings. Reports were received throughout the day from General Numeiri's mission, which by the evening had reported that agreement on a cease-fire had been reached. The mission themselves returned to Cairo late that evening, accompanied by four members of the PLO Central Committee released from their detention by the Jordanian Government. There were still no signs that Tunisian hopes of assembling both King Hussein and Yasir Arafat in Cairo would be achieved, and it was clear that the Palestinian line was becoming increasingly confused, with conflicting statements being issued in Damascus, Cairo and Baghdad. Early in the morning of 24 September, a Palestinian delegation left Cairo for Damascus in the hope of unifying Palestinian policies. Meanwhile, the Jordanian delegation remained virtually in Coventry at their hotel.

12. On 24 September, President Helu of Lebanon was replaced by his successor President Franjieh, who had now taken office. Reports had meanwhile been received of a resumption of fighting in Jordan and a further delegation under General Numeiri, who on this occasion was accompanied by the Tunisian Prime Minister, Mr. Husain Shafai of the UAR, the Kuwait Minister of Defence, Shaikh Rashad Pharaon of Saudi Arabia, the Sudanese Foreign Minister and the UAR Chief of Staff, left for Amman, in the hope of contacting both King Hussein and Arafat (whom General Numeiri had so far been unable to meet).

13. On 25 September, while the situation in Amman was still uncertain and while most of the delegations no doubt still hoped to avoid too firm a commitment to one side or the other, Colonel Qaddafi took the characteristically precipitate move of severing relations with the Jordanian Government, from whom the Libyans had already withdrawn their Khartoum aid. It was also announced that Colonel Qaddafi had offered political asylum to Brigadier Daud, who in a dramatic move had disappeared from his hotel on the previous day leaving behind a note of resignation. Late on that evening, the delegation under General Numeiri returned from Amman bringing Yasir Arafat with them. Heads of State were already in session at the Hilton Hotel when they were joined by Arafat shortly after 11 p.m. The meeting continued for more than three hours, and (to judge from the message subsequently sent by President Nasser to King Hussein) was intensely critical of the Jordanian authorities and increasingly sympathetic to the plight of the Palestinians.

14. On the following morning, 26 September, General Numeiri and most other members of his delegation appeared at a Press conference in which they each described their experiences and views of the situation in Jordan. These were universally critical of the King and the tone of the Press in Cairo became increasingly bitter about what General Numeiri openly described as premeditated genocide. The impression given by Mr. Pharaon's absence was that the Saudis agreed the findings but were not prepared to do so publicly.

15. It was against this background that King Hussein, with considerable courage and wisdom, decided to attend the meeting himself. On the morning of 27 September he arrived at Cairo airport and was met by President Nasser. The Press were kept well back, and no photographs of his reception appeared on the following day, but we were told that after a slight hesitation King Hussein took the initiative of coming forward and the two leaders, whose relationship had suffered worse strains than this in the past few years, embraced. A full day of meetings followed, on which we still have little reliable information. It is said that both King Hussein and Arafat flanked President Nasser at the meetings with revolvers on the table before them, until persuaded by King Faisal to put them away. It is also reliably reported that Colonel Qaddafi refused to shake hands with King Hussein and it is probably significant that Qaddafi was the first to leave Cairo that evening. Nevertheless, agreement was finally reached later that day and the Press were invited at 8.45 p.m. to witness the signing of an agreement, the text of which was reported in my telegram No. 1080.

16. The immediate outcome of these meetings seems to have been in short:

- (i) Whatever the individual views of the participants the collective view to which they felt obliged to subscribe was that foreign intervention in Jordan and United States intervention in particular was to be avoided at all costs.
- (ii) Hence there was strong disapproval of Syrian intervention and President Atassi is said to have returned to Syria in dudgeon.
- (iii) The assembled Heads of State were very impressed with the reports of the UAR Chief of Staff, General Numeiri and, in particular, of the Tunisian Prime Minister that the Jordan Army was behaving with quite unnecessary and, in any case, quite unacceptable brutality—perhaps according to a pre-arranged plan to intimidate if not annihilate as many Palestinians as possible.
- (iv) They accordingly gave King Hussein a very cold reception (to which Nasser, as host, was the exception) and they were not convinced by his explanations.
- (v) Nevertheless—and with the agreement of Arafat—they determined that the Hashemite State should be upheld, but that King Hussein's freedom of military action as well as that of the Fedayin should be curtailed by the appointment of the Higher Follow-up Committee, with its three subsidiaries: the military committee to supervise the cease-fire; the civilian (political) committee for non-military affairs arising between the two partes; and, the relief committee to supervise the distribution of medical aid and supplies from the Arab countries. The last-named committee subsumed the Relief Committee earlier set up under King Faisal.

17. At the time of writing, it is impossible to say, nor indeed is it for me to judge, how far the agreement can bring about a real settlement of the situation in Jordan. It is, however, something of a triumph that the Tunisians, who were until recently regarded in Cairo as one of the pariahs of the Arab world, should have proposed and carried through this initiative and Egyptian participants spoke in terms of high praise of the calm and constructive part played by Mr. Ladgham. But it was ultimately a triumph of President Nasser's personal weight and diplomacy that the meeting concluded in any agreement at all. It must be some

consolation to the Egyptian people and to the Arabs in general that President Nasser should have died in the immediate aftermath of a successful attempt to bring conciliation to Jordan.

18. There is no space in this despatch to deal fully with the developments which the last few months have brought about in Egyptian relations both with the Palestinians and with King Hussein. It is enough to point out that, since Mr. Stewart wrote his despatch of 10 July on UAR relations with the Palestinians, broadcasting facilities allotted to Fatah in Cairo had been closed down on 28 July, numbers of Palestinian students (and probably many more than the 140 admitted by the local Press) had been expelled from the UAR and the Palestinian Liberation Army (such as it was) had almost certainly been removed from the Canal. Subsequent hijacking incidents, including the destruction of a Boeing 747 at Cairo airport on 7 September, had strained relations between the Egyptians and the Palestinians even further. This is worth recalling at this point, since it highlights the subsequent sharp deterioration in relations between the Egyptian and Jordanian Governments following the incidents in Jordan in mid-September. The Cairo agreement of 27 September may have succeeded in holding Egyptian attitudes to both the Palestinians and the Jordanians in a position of comparatively non-committal neutrality. I have no doubt that in future the UAR Government will continue to pay lip service to the Palestinian guerillas and that their policy will remain based on the principle which Nasser was so fond of quoting: "The settlement of the Arab-Israel problem depends on the restoration of the occupied territories and the satisfaction of the rights of the Palestinian people - the land and the people." In pursuit of this policy I believe that their aims for Jordan will continue to be, first, to prevent outside intervention, particularly by the two Ba'athist States of Syria and Iraq, and secondly, to do what they can to ensure the survival of King Hussein, since he provides the only possible partner in the quest for a political settlement. In spite of some statements to the contrary by Palestinian "spokesmen" I believe that several elements in the Palestinian organisations, including Arafat himself, still share both these aims though not necessarily for the same reasons. But since the confrontation between the Palestinians and King Hussein has confirmed the durability of the Palestinian entity, I would suspect that the UAR Government's future interpretation of Nasser's principle would lay more stress on the restoration of the occupied territories while leaving it increasingly to the Palestinians themselves to define and to obtain their "rights".

19. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives in Washington, United Kingdom Mission, New York, Paris, Moscow, Amman, Tel Aviv, Baghdad, Kuwait, Aden, Jedda, Khartoum, Tripoli, Tunis, Algiers and Rabat.

I have, etc.,

R. A. BEAUMONT.

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX

CALENDAR OF EVENTS

(As reported in the UAR Press)

22 September

- c. 0900 Jordanian delegation under Brigadier Daud arrives.
1045 President Nasser meets Ruler of Kuwait.
1100 Meeting in Kubba Palace: President Nasser, General Numeiri, Colonel Qaddafi, President Helu, Ruler of Kuwait, Prime Minister Ladgham of Tunisia. Also present were Vice-President Anwar Sadat, Mr. Hussain al Shafei, Mr. Ali Sabri, General Muhammad Sadiq.
1150 President Nasser leaves meeting to contact King Hussein by telephone.
1220- General Numeiri contacts King Hussein.
1240
1230- Heads of State go to Aruba Palace to meet President Atassi of Syria, returning for
1400 lunch at Kubba Palace.
1600- Meeting between Presidents Nasser, Qaddafi and Atassi.
1630
Later General Numeiri, Mr. Ladgham, Sheikh Sabah and General Sadiq leave for Amman, seen off by President Nasser, who also meets Qadi Abdul Rahman al Iriani of Yemen and Chairman Salim Rabie Ali of South Yemen on arrival. President Atassi calls on Mr. Rabie.
2100 Dinner given by Colonel Qaddafi followed by meetings until early morning at Kubba Palace.

23 September

- a.m. President Atassi leaves for Damascus, accompanied by Major Khuweildi Humaidi of Libyan Revolutionary Command Council. Colonel Qaddafi meets Mr. Rabie.
1100 Meetings resume. President Nasser leaves to meet King Faisal of Saudi Arabia at the airport.
1230- President Nasser and King Faisal join the meeting, which considers General
1400 Numeiri's report on his three-hour meeting with King Hussein, and agrees to set up a Relief Committee under King Faisal.
1400 Vice-President Anwar Sadat escorts King Faisal to Hilton Hotel.
2000 Meetings resume at Hilton Hotel.
2050 President Nasser and Colonel Qaddafi meet returning delegation, accompanied by Faruq Qaddumi (Abu Lutf), Saleh Khalaf (Abu Ayyad), Nahjat Abu Gharbia and Ibrahim Bakr of PLO Central Committee.
2215 Meetings resume at Hilton, joined by Presidents Nasser, Qaddafi, Numeiri and the delegation until 1.00 a.m. to listen to General Numeiri's report.

24 September

- 0200 Palestinian delegation (Abu Lutf and Nahjat Abu Gharbia) leaves for Damascus.
c. 0600 President Iriani returns to Sanaa (thereafter represented by Ahmad al Shami).
1030 President Franjich of Lebanon arrives to take President Helu's place. Meetings until the afternoon.
1630 President Nasser meets Colonel Qaddafi, and has separate meetings with President Franjich, King Faisal, General Numeiri, Ruler of Kuwait and Mr. Ladgham.
1645 Delegation of General Numeiri, Mr. Ladgham, Mr. Shafei, Kuwait Minister of Defence, Sheikh Rashad Pharaon, Sudanese Foreign Minister, General Sadiq and Ibrahim Bakr leaves for Amman.
p.m. Major Khuweildi Humaidi returns from Damascus.
p.m. Palestinian delegation returns from Damascus with Zuhair Ilmi and Khalid Qahum.
2030 Meeting at the Hilton Hotel.
2310 General Numeiri appeals to Yassir Arafat on Amman Radio to arrange a meeting with him.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

25 September

0045 Arafat replies to General Numeiri's appeal. They meet at the UAR Embassy in Amman "early in the morning".

a.m. Libyan Ambassador in Cairo announces that Libya has severed relations with Jordan. Ahram also reports that Colonel Qaddafi has offered asylum to Brigadier Daud.

a.m. Meetings between King Faisal, Ruler of Kuwait and Colonel Qaddafi; and between Colonel Qaddafi and Mr. Rabie.

p.m. President Nasser receives Colonel Qaddafi; they are later joined by Mr. Rabie.

1930-2030 Meetings to consider report from General Numeiri in Amman.

King Faisal receives Abu Ayyad, Abu Yussuf, Zuhair Ilmi.

2145 General Numeiri's delegation, accompanied by Yassir Arafat, returns to Cairo.

2230 President Nasser and General Numeiri join meeting at Hilton. General Numeiri reports on his visit to Amman.

2305-0230 Meeting with Arafat at Hilton Hotel.

26 September

1100 General Numeiri and most of his delegation hold a Press conference at the Arab Socialist Union Buildings in Cairo to explain their report criticising King Hussein.

p.m. Message is received from King Hussein to say that he will arrive in Cairo on 27 September.

27 September

a.m. President Nasser and Mr. Ladgham meet King Hussein on arrival at Cairo Airport. Arab Truce Supervisory Committee leaves Cairo for Amman.

1315-1600 First meeting to draft broad lines of agreement.

1600-1730 General Numeiri and Mr. Ladgham consider draft in Committee.

1730 Discussion between drafting committee and President Nasser, joined by Arafat and Colonel Qaddafi.

1815-2045 Second meeting to conclude agreement.

2045 Press invited to witness signature of agreement.

2200 Colonel Qaddafi leaves for Libya. President Nasser sends a message to President Bourguiba, asking him to spare his Prime Minister to head a "Supreme Follow-Up Committee" (to include 10 Libyans).

28 September

0945 Tunisian Prime Minister, Mr. Ladgham, leaves for Amman as Chairman of the Follow-Up Committee.

1045 President Franjeh leaves for Beirut.

1115 King Hussein leaves for Amman.

1215 General Numeiri leaves for Khartoum.

1345 King Faisal leaves for Geneva.

1515 Sheikh Sabah al Salem al Sabah leaves for Kuwait. All five Heads of State were seen off by President Nasser, who was taken ill at the airport.

1815 President Nasser dies.

TOP COPY

EN CLAIR

ROUTINE KUWAIT

TELEGRAM NO 381

UNCLASSIFIED 270815Z

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

27 OCTOBER 1970

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELEGRAM NO381
DATED 27.10.70 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION SAVING TO CAIRO.

SIR R. BEAUMONT'S DESPATCH 2/8 OF 7 OCTOBER.

IN THE INTERESTS OF HISTORICAL ACCURACY YOU MAY WISH TO KNOW
BEFORE THIS DESPATCH GOES TO PRINT THAT IT WAS *SHEIKH SA'AD AL
ABDULLAH (THE KUWAIT MINISTER OF DEFENCE AND INTERIOR) AND NOT
THE AMIR OF KUWAIT WHO WENT TO AMMAN WITH GENERAL NUMEIRI ON
BOTH 22 AND 24 SEPTEMBER.

THE AMIR WAS IN CAIRO BUT DID NOT GO TO AMMAN AT ALL.

MR. GOODISON

* Despatch amended
4/11

FILES

ARABIAN DEPT.

N.E. DEPT.

N.A. DEPT.

SIR W. LUCE

NEJ 1/8

FFFFF

CONFIDENTIAL**(LAST PAPER)**

Near Eastern Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London S.W.1

(NEJ 1/8)

3 November, 1970

[Handwritten signature]
x/11

President Nasser's Last Summit

Since your Despatch (2/8) of 7 October is entered with my department, I am writing to thank you for it. We found it a most useful and clear account of a somewhat chaotic series of meetings, which must have been unusually difficult to follow.

2. As you say, President Nasser's death must cast doubt on conclusions about the meeting. But we draw encouragement from your description of how the assembled Presidents and Kings, despite their acute condemnation of what was going on in Jordan and of King Hussein's responsibility for it, nonetheless joined in efforts to stave off foreign (including other Arab) intervention in Jordan and to re-establish his authority. For this much of the credit must go to President Nasser, and the least tribute we can pay to a politician towards whom our views and King Hussein's have oscillated so widely will be to say so publicly one day. But the Tunisian Prime Minister also deserves great credit, not least for the constructive and taxing part he has played in putting the agreement into effect.

3. While we accept your forecast about future U.A.R. policy towards Jordan (your paragraph 18), we fear that the Hashemite régime is going to be in trouble again before long and that King Hussein is going to need all possible support.

(R. M. Evans)

His Excellency,
Sir R. A. Beaumont, K.C.M.G., O.B.E.,
CAIRO.

(LAST PAPER)Copy to:

His Excellency,
Mr. J. F. S. Phillips, C.M.G.,
AMMAN.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Registry
No. NEJ 1/8

DRAFT

Type 1 +

Type
fair
pl

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Unclassified.

To:—

Sir R.A. Beaumont, K.C.M.G.,
O.B.E.,
CAIRO

From

Mr. Evans

Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

President Nasser's Last Summit

of 7 October

Since your Despatch 2/8/15 is entered with my department, I am writing to thank you for it. We found it a most useful and clear account of a somewhat chaotic series of meetings, which must have been unusually difficult to follow.

c.c.

Mr. Phillips
AMMAN

2. As you say, President Nasser's death must cast doubt on conclusions about the meeting. But we ~~share~~ ~~and~~ draw encouragement from your description of how the assembled Presidents and Kings, despite their acute condemnation of what was going on in Jordan and of King Hussein's responsibility for it, nonetheless joined in efforts to stave off ^(including other) foreign Arab intervention ^{in Jordan to} and reestablish his ^{authority} ~~regime~~. For this much of the credit must go to President Nasser, and ~~to~~ ^{at least} ~~he~~ ^{we can pay} is a fitting tribute to a politician towards whom our views and King Hussein's have oscillated so widely ^{will be to say so publicly one day.} ~~to be able to say so.~~ But the Tunisian Prime Minister also deserves great credit, not least for the constructive and taxing part he has played in putting the agreement into effect.

3. ^{while we accept} ~~I hope~~ your forecast ^{about} of future U.A.R. policy towards Jordan (your paragraph 18), ~~is right~~ ~~we~~

~~there~~ we

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

CONFIDENTIAL

Fear that the Hashemite regime is going to ~~be~~ ^{be in trouble again} ~~here still believe that~~ King Hussein is going to need ~~all possible support,~~ before.
long and.
that

of 3/xi

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

CONFIDENTIAL